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Abstract
In recent years, the un Security Council has repeatedly come under criticism for its 
inaction in the face of serious violations of international law. As a means to prevent 
further deadlocks, this article advocates the introduction of a duty to explain votes cast 
in the Council. In certain situations, such a duty to give reasons already exists today, 
although it is not implemented. We propose to extend this duty to all votes in the Se-
curity Council and to codify it in its Provisional Rules of Procedure. A comprehensive 
duty to give reasons has three major virtues: it increases the quality of Council deci-
sions, it enhances legal certainty, and it improves the accountability of the Council and 
of its members. As opposed to structural reforms, our proposal does not necessitate 
amending the un Charter and thus does not depend on the consent of the Council’s 
permanent members.
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Provisional Rules of Procedure – duty to give reasons – discourse theory – transparency – 
Security Council reform
Moeckli and Fasel
international organizations law review 14 (2017) 13-86
<UN>
14
1 un General Assembly, Resolution 69/188 (18 December 2014), un Doc. a/res/69/188.
2 Human Rights Council, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on its Twenty-Fifth Session, (7 February 2014), un  
Doc. a/hrc/25/63.
3 On 22 December 2014, for example, the Chinese representative in the Security Council— 
after having unsuccessfully opposed that the situation be placed on the Council’s provisional 
agenda—declared: “We oppose the adoption of any outcome document by the Council on 
the human rights situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” un Security Coun-
cil, 69th Session, 7353rd meeting (22 December 2014), un Doc. s/pv.7353, p. 16.
4 un Charter, Art 108.
5 See infra Section 4.2.1.
 Introduction
On 18 December 2014 the un General Assembly called on the Security Coun-
cil to consider referring the situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea to the International Criminal Court (‘icc’).1 The resolution, adopted by 
a vote of 116 to 20 with 53 abstentions, followed a un Commission of Inquiry 
report that detailed systematic, widespread and gross violations of human 
rights in North Korea and concluded that, in many instances, these violations 
amounted to crimes against humanity.2 It is, however, unlikely that a resolu-
tion referring the situation in North Korea to the icc would even be proposed 
in the Security Council since China has made it clear that it will veto any such 
proposal.3
This and similar instances of inaction by the Security Council in the face of 
serious violations of international law, including with regard to the situations 
in Syria and Israel/Palestine, have reignited criticism of the Council. However, 
it would be naïve to expect that deadlocks of the Council could be addressed 
through reform of membership of the Council or the veto power. Any such 
reform would require an amendment of the un Charter, which can be blocked 
by the non-ratification of one of the Council’s five permanent members (‘p5’).4
In this article, we explain how the risk of such deadlocks of the Security 
Council could be minimized through a change of its procedure, rather than its 
structure. We argue that enhancing the transparency of the Council’s working 
methods would help it better perform its tasks. More specifically, we suggest 
the introduction of a duty to give reasons for votes cast in the Security Council. 
As opposed to structural reforms, our proposal does not depend on the con-
sent of the p5: it can be implemented through an amendment of the Council’s 
Provisional Rules of Procedure (‘PRoP’), which only requires the affirmative 
vote of nine members.5
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6 Michael C. Wood, ‘Security Council Working Methods and Procedure: Recent Developments’ 
(1996) 45 International and Comparative Law Quarterly p. 151.
7 Michael C. Wood, ‘The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions’ (1998) 2 Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations Law p. 74.
8 See infra Figure 1.
In Section 1, we analyse the working methods of the Security Council and 
its subsidiary bodies and highlight the lack of transparency, in particular the 
absence of a duty to give reasons for decisions or votes. Section 2 discusses the 
legal limits that are applicable to acts (or omissions) of the Security Council as 
a collective body as well as the voting behaviour of its members. We argue that 
the Council does not operate in a legal vacuum and that compliance with the 
legal limits imposed on it and its members can be reviewed in various ways. 
However, a meaningful legal review of the Council’s acts and its members’ 
votes is only possible if the reviewing body knows the motives behind them. 
In Section 3, we show that, in certain situations, there is already today, de lege 
lata, an obligation incumbent on the Security Council to give reasons for its 
decisions and, respectively, on its members to explain their votes. In Section 4, 
we sketch out a proposal to introduce, de lege ferenda, a comprehensive duty 
to explain in a public meeting every vote cast in the Security Council. Such a 
duty to give reasons, we argue, has three major virtues: it increases the quality 
of Council decisions, it enhances legal certainty, and it improves the account-
ability of the Council as a whole and of its members.
1 Lack of Transparency in Security Council Deliberations
Today, the Security Council conducts the bulk of its business behind closed 
doors. As a general rule, reasons are given neither for the votes cast in the Coun-
cil by its members nor for the Council’s decisions themselves (Section 1.1). The 
working methods of the subsidiary bodies established by the Security Council 
are even more obscure. Often they do not even communicate their decisions, 
let alone the reasons for them (Section 1.2).
1.1 Working Methods of the Security Council
In the first decades of its existence, the Security Council met only rarely and 
did not decide much. On average it adopted fourteen resolutions a year,6 most 
of which did not attract much attention.7 With the end of the Cold War, this 
changed dramatically. Not only does the Council now meet on an almost daily 
basis and pass significantly more resolutions: on average 62 a year.8 It has also 
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9 See e.g. Ian Johnstone, ‘Legislation and Adjudication in the un Security Council: Bring-
ing Down the Deliberative Deficit’ (2008) 102 American Journal of International Law  
p. 275; Paul C. Szasz, ‘The Security Council Starts Legislating’ (2002) 96 American Journal 
of International Law p. 901; Stefan Talmon, ‘The Security Council as World Legislature’ 
(2005) 99 American Journal of International Law p. 175.
10 See Loraine Sievers and Sam Daws, The Procedure of the un Security Council (4th ed) 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) pp. 9–12 for a detailed account.
11 Pascale Baeriswyl, ‘Revolution durch die Hintertür: Moderne Arbeitsmethoden für einen 
wirksameren un-Sicherheitsrat’ (2013) 5 Vereinte Nationen p. 197; Helmut Volger, ‘Mehr 
Transparenz und mehr Beteiligung: Die informelle Reform der Arbeitsmethoden des un-
Sicherheitsrats’ (2010) 5 Vereinte Nationen p. 196.
12 Wood, supra note 6, p. 160.
13 Wood, supra note 7, p. 80.
14 See ibid., pp. 80–82.
15 Sievers and Daws, supra note 10, p. 396; Baeriswyl, supra note 11, p. 199.
expanded its scope of activity in qualitative terms: Beyond the executive func-
tions for which it was originally designed, the Security Council today regularly 
acts as an administrative body, directly affecting important interests of individ-
uals and entities other than states, and even performs certain legislative tasks.9 
As a consequence, its resolutions have become more complex and significant.
The working methods of the Security Council have in no way kept pace with 
these developments. They are still based on the PRoP, which were discussed 
at the Council’s very first meeting of 17 January 1946 and adopted on 9 April 
1946.10 As their title indicates, these were originally merely meant to serve as an 
interim solution but became permanent as the Council members (especially 
the p5) preferred to retain flexibility rather than to settle on a fixed, detailed set 
of procedures.11 Compared with the rules of procedure of other international 
organs, they are rudimentary.12 The PRoP contain only few, very basic rules on 
decision-making. In particular, they fail to provide for a standard procedure or 
an institutional mechanism to ensure that resolutions are well drafted.13
How does a resolution of the Security Council come about? Normally, a 
member of the Security Council (the so-called ‘sponsor’ of the resolution)—
most often one of the p5—prepares a first draft, which is then discussed with 
the delegations of some friendly states (which may or may not be Council mem-
bers). This may be followed by informal consultations with the  other members 
of the Council.14 In most cases, however, only some select Council members—
typically the other permanent members—are consulted.15 As the representa-
tive of South Africa has complained, “resolutions and decisions of the Council 
are often drafted in small groups and presented as faits accomplis to elected 
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16 un Security Council, 67th Session, 6870th meeting (26 November 2012) un Doc. s/pv.6870, 
p. 17 (emphasis added).
17 PRoP (17 January 1946), un Doc. s/96/Rev.7, Rule 48.
18 This is referred to as ‘statement before/after the vote’ or ‘explanation of vote’. Sievers and 
Daws, supra note 10, pp. 357–359.
19 un Charter, Art 27(3).
20 Wood, supra note 7, pp. 86–87.
21 PRoP Rule 54.
22 Michael P. Scharf and Joshua L. Dorosin, ‘Interpreting un Sanctions: The Rulings and Role 
of the Yugoslavia Sanctions Committee’ (1993) 19 Brooklyn Journal of International Law  
p. 825.
members.”16 Finally, the text of the draft resolution is circulated as an official 
document of the Security Council.
The President of the Security Council then calls a formal meeting of the 
Security Council, which, as a rule, is public.17 In the meeting, the members 
vote on the draft resolution by show of hands. In addition to statements made 
in the general debate preceding the vote, members may also explain their vote 
orally either before or after the vote.18 However, they are not obliged to do so. A 
resolution is adopted if nine or more of the fifteen members vote for it, and if 
it is not vetoed by any of the p5.19 The text of the resolution itself does not con-
tain any reasons. While it is sometimes possible to glean some reasons from 
the preamble of a resolution, most preambles only include clauses that mem-
bers could not find an agreement on and that were therefore removed from the 
operative part of the resolution.20
This means that the reasons why a resolution has (or has not) been adopted 
can only be gathered from the statements and explanations given in the formal 
meeting. Of these meetings, verbatim records are kept, which are published21 
and can be accessed on the website of the Security Council. However, the mem-
bers of the Security Council only very rarely explain their votes. To the extent 
that explanations are given, they are mainly used to make political statements 
rather than to clarify meaning.22 As a consequence, only those members that 
were themselves involved in the drafting of a given Security Council resolution 
will be able to understand the full significance of the action taken. Since in 
most cases the drafting process is in the hands of only some of the members—
typically the p5—all the other states, the media as well as the wider public will 
not be aware of the motives behind a given resolution.
This problem has arguably intensified over the last few years. The explosion 
of the workload of the Security Council in the early 1990s led to greater atten-
tion being paid to its working methods, which increasingly came to be seen as 
outdated. Accordingly, calls were raised for a reform of the Council’s working 
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23 See for a good overview Security Council Report, Special Research Report 2007 No 3: Se-
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ing Methods 1993–2007, 18 October 2007 (‘Security Council Report 2007, No 3’); Security 
Council Report, Update Report: Security Council Working Methods, 12 August 2008 (‘Secu-
rity Council Report, Update Report’); Security Council Report, Special Research Report 
2010 No 1: Security Council Working Methods: A Work in Progress? 30 March 2010 (‘Security 
Council Report 2010, No 1’).
24 un President of the Security Council, Note (26 July 2010), un Doc. s/2010/507, para. 1. This 
Note further developed Note (19 July 2006), un Doc. s/2006/507; Note (19 December 2007), 
un Doc. S/2007/749; and Note (31 December 2008), un Doc. s/2008/847. See also Note  
(7 February 2006), un Doc. s/2006/78 (including an index of Notes and Statements by the 
President of the Security Council relating to documentation and procedure from 1993 to 
2005).
25 Sievers and Daws, supra note 10, pp. 92–94.
26 un President of the Security Council, Note (26 July 2010), un Doc. s/2010/507, Annex.
27 Natalie Reid, Global Policy Forum, Informal Consultations, 1999, available at: <https://
www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/32941.html>.
methods, in particular for improvements with regard to transparency, effec-
tiveness, accountability, and participation.23 A number of important reforms 
were in fact implemented over the following 20 years. The Note by the Presi-
dent of the Security Council on the Council’s working methods of 2010 lists 73 
practices and measures designed “to enhance the efficiency and transparency 
of the Council’s work, as well as interaction and dialogue with non-Council 
members”, which had been agreed in preceding years.24 These include, among 
others, regular briefings of un member states, improved documentation of 
the Council’s work, publication of the programme of work, increased recourse 
to open meetings, introduction of new meeting formats, improvements with 
regard to the annual report to the General Assembly, better briefing of new-
ly elected Council members, expanded consultation and cooperation with 
international and regional organizations (such as in ‘Informal Interactive 
Dialogues’),25 increased discussion and consultation with troop- and police-
contributing countries and other interested states, and, finally, holding of in-
formal ‘Arria-formula’ meetings with non-state actors.26
Yet these efforts to make the Council’s formal procedures more transparent 
also had a counterproductive effect in that, combined with the rising work-
load, they led to a shift of decision-making to more informal settings, which 
Council members see as more efficient and conducive to compromise.27  
During the 1990s ‘informal consultations’—be it of all the members of the 
Security Council (‘informal consultations of the whole’) or of some of them 
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Making’ (1985) 18 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics p. 267; Reid, 
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30 For the period 2001–2015, the graph is based on Repertoire of the Security Council, Secu-
rity Council Meetings and Consultations in 2001–2015 available at: <www.un.org/en/sc/
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lights of Security Council Practice 2012, available at: <www.un.org/en/sc/inc/pages/pdf/
highlights/2012.pdf> (for the number of Arria-formula meetings and Informal Interac-
tive Dialogues in 2008), on Highlights of Security Council Practice 2013, available at: <www 
.un.org/en/sc/inc/pages/pdf/highlights/2013.pdf> (for the number of Arria-formula meet-
ings and Informal Interactive Dialogues in 2009), on Highlights of Security Council Practice 
2014, available at: <www.un.org/en/sc/inc/pages/pdf/highlights/2014.pdf> (for the num-
ber of Arria-formula meetings and Informal Interactive Dialogues in 2010), and on High-
lights of Security Council Practice 2015, available at: <www.un.org/en/sc/inc/pages/pdf/ 
highlights/2015.pdf> (for the number of Arria-formula meetings and Informal Interactive Di-
alogues in 2011–2015). For the period 1988–2000, official Security Council data is unreliable, 
which is why the graph is based on Global Policy Forum, Number of Security Council Formal 
Meetings and Informal Consultations: 1988–2010, available at: <www.globalpolicy.org/images/
pdfs/Number_of_Security_Council_Formal_Meetings_and_Informal_Consultations.pdf>.
(notably the p5)28—became the preferred forum for carrying out the bulk of 
the Council’s work.29
As opposed to the Council’s formal meetings, informal consultations are not 
public, no official records are kept and non-members of the Council cannot 
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Figure 1 Number of formal and informal meetings of the Security Council between 1988  
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31 Sievers and Daws, supra note 10, p. 65. While the Secretariat takes notes of informal con-
sultations for their own internal purposes, these are not available to others: Wood, supra 
note 7, footnote 33.
32 un Security Council, 49th Session, 3483rd meeting (16 December 1994), un Doc. s/pv.3483.
33 Wood, supra note 6, pp. 155–156.
34 Reid, supra note 27; Ian Hurd, ‘Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the un Secu-
rity Council’ (2002) 8 Global Governance pp. 42–3; Bailey and Daws, supra note 28, p. 76.
35 See e.g. un Security Council, 69th Session, 7188th meeting (29 May 2014), un Doc. s/pv.7188.
36 See e.g. un Security Council, 64th Session, 6253rd meeting (23 December 2009), un Doc. 
s/pv.6253.
37 Erika de Wet, The Chapter vii Powers of the United Nations Security Council (Hart Publish-
ing, Oxford, 2004) p. 108.
38 un Security Council, 56th Session, 4385th meeting (28 September 2001), un Doc. s/pv.4385.
39 Ibid.
attend.31 They are not provided for in the Charter or the PRoP. As the then-
French permanent representative put it, “informal meetings are not even real 
Council meetings at all; they have no official existence, and are assigned no 
number.”32 Nevertheless, almost all the important decisions of the Security 
Council are now agreed in advance in these informal, secret consultations.33 
Informal consultations have replaced the formal Security Council meetings as 
the central forum for political interaction on questions relating to internation-
al peace and security.
At the same time, the formal public Security Council meetings have been re-
duced to pro forma affairs: they merely serve to put on record what has already 
been informally agreed. As opposed to informal consultations, which may run 
into several sessions lasting many hours, the formal meetings often do not last 
longer than five to ten minutes.34 In opening an official meeting, the President 
of the Council will typically refer to the text of a draft resolution that has been 
submitted,35 often noting that “the Council is meeting in accordance with the 
understanding reached in its prior consultations”.36 The Council will then pro-
ceed to the vote. Actual discussions or debates have become very rare. As Erika 
de Wet has concluded, “[t]he net result is that the Security Council meets in 
public only to adopt resolutions already agreed upon in informal meetings, 
without giving any insight into the motives underpinning its decisions.”37 This 
even holds true for resolutions of far-reaching importance such as Security 
Council Resolution 1373, passed after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. 
Despite the complexity of the issues addressed in, and raised by, this resolu-
tion and despite its legislative nature, the respective meeting only lasted five 
minutes.38 Not a single statement was made on the draft resolution, and no 
Council member explained its vote.39
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41 Reid, supra note 27; Bailey and Daws, supra note 28, pp. 68–73. See Teresa Whitfield, 
‘Groups of Friends’ in David M. Malone (ed), The un Security Council: From the Cold War 
to the 21st Century (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder co, 2004) p. 311.
42 Security Council Report 2007, No 3, supra note 23, p. 6; Security Council Report 2010, 
No 1, supra note 23, pp. 8–9.
43 Security Council Report 2010, No 1, supra note 23, p. 9.
44 There are currently 13 Security Council sanctions committees in place. For an overview, 
see the respective un website: un Security Council Sanctions Committees, Security Coun-
cil Sanctions Committees: An Overview, available at: <https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/
sanctions/information>.
45 Jeremy Farrall, ‘Should the United Nations Security Council Leave It to the Experts? The 
Governance and Accountability of un Sanctions Monitoring’ in Jeremy Farrall and Kim 
Rubenstein (eds), Sanctions, Accountability and Governance in a Globalised World (Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009) p. 191, p. 194.
46 De Wet, supra note 37, p. 253.
As ‘informal consultations of the whole’ have become institutionalized 
and—to some extent—themselves formalized,40 there has been a trend to 
move discussions and decision-making to smaller, even more informal settings. 
These may be meetings of groups of states (such as the p5, ‘Groups of Friends’ 
or ‘Contact Groups’)41 or even lower level meetings of experts.42 This trend of 
delegating substantive negotiations to more exclusive fora is problematic as it 
“produces even deeper layers of informality and confidentiality.”43 Confidenti-
ality characterizes not only the working methods of the Security Council itself 
but also those of its subsidiary bodies.
1.2 Working Methods of Subsidiary Bodies
The Security Council has established, as it is authorized to by Article 29 of the 
un Charter, several subsidiary bodies whose composition mirrors its own. In 
many respects, the procedures of these subsidiary bodies are even more ob-
scure than those of the Council itself. As is the case with the Council, the bulk 
of their work is carried out in informal consultations, which are held in private 
and without a record being taken.
The most important subsidiary bodies are the committees created by the 
Council to administer and monitor sanctions.44 As a general rule, the various 
sanctions committees conduct their business behind closed doors and do not 
publish records of their meetings.45 They only rarely give reasons for their 
decisions.46
For example, the meetings of the Iraq Sanctions Committee, established in 
1990 by Security Council Resolution 661, were secret and minutes were only 
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47 Paul Conlon, ‘Lessons from Iraq: The Functions of the Iraq Sanctions Committee as a 
Source of Sanctions Implementation Authority and Practice’ (1995) 35 Virginia Journal of 
International Law p. 655; Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Le Comité des sanctions créé par la Réso-
lution 661 (1990) du Conseil de Sécurité’ (1991) 37 Annuaire français de droit international  
p. 123.
48 Conlon, supra note 47, pp. 655–656.
49 Ibid., p. 656; Koskenniemi, supra note 47, p. 123.
50 Scharf and Dorosin, supra note 22, p. 822.
51 Ibid., p. 823.
52 Ibid., pp. 825–826.
53 See infra Section 4.2.5.
54 Watson Institute Targeted Sanctions Project, Strengthening Targeted Sanctions through 
Fair and Clear Procedures: White Paper, 30 March 2006, pp. 7, 26, 34, 36. See also Johnstone, 
supra note 9, p. 298 and Devika Hovell, The Power of Process: The Value of Due Process 
in Security Council Sanctions Decision-Making (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016) 
pp. 17–20 (discussing more specifically the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee).
kept in the form of summary, not verbatim, records.47 While in the judgment 
of the Committee’s former deputy secretary this created a more efficient, 
“more businesslike atmosphere”, he also took the view that the Committee had 
taken the matter of secrecy too far, as its decisions were not communicated to 
all states potentially affected by them.48 In fact, the Committee was not even 
required to give account of its activities to the organ that had created it, the 
Security Council.49
Similarly, the Yugoslavia Sanctions Committee, created in 1991, met behind 
closed doors and did not even record the vote of its members.50 Rather than 
publishing reasoned decisions, it only issued “brief conclusory communica-
tions, with the barest references to context”, often making it impossible to as-
certain the facts the Committee considered material.51 This led commentators 
to conclude that “the Committee has operated in obscurity, with its rulings and 
record familiar only to a handful of government officials, despite the fact that 
the interpretations of the Committee have a direct impact on the conduct of 
thousands of businesses around the world on a daily basis.”52
Also committees that administer so-called targeted sanctions, that is, sanc-
tions that are directed against individuals and specific groups rather than 
states, exhibit a lack of transparency. While it may be appropriate for the delib-
erations on individual cases of such committees to be confidential,53 even gen-
eral information about the basis for including individuals and groups on the 
respective sanctions lists (or removing them from these lists) is generally not 
publicly available.54 Between 1999 and 2005, the former Al-Qaida and Taliban 
Sanctions Committee, established according to Security Council Resolution 
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56 un Security Council, Resolution 1988, 17 June 2011 (un Doc. s/res/1988); un Security 
Council, Resolution 1989, 17 June 2011 (un Doc. s/res/1989).
57 Devika Hovell, ‘The Deliberative Deficit: Transparency, Access to Information and un 
Sanctions’ in Jeremy Farrall and Kim Rubenstein (eds), Sanctions, Accountability and Gov-
ernance in a Globalised World (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009) pp. 92, 95.
58 Watson Institute Targeted Sanctions Project, supra note 54, p. 30.
59 Ibid., pp. 7, 30.
60 Ibid., p. 7.
61 See e.g. un President of the Security Council, Note (29 March 1995), un Doc. s/1995/234; 
Note (29 January 1999), un Doc. s/1999/92, paras. 18–20 (on the work of the sanctions 
committees).
62 un Security Council, Resolution 1526 (30 January 2004), un Doc. s/res/1526, para. 17.
63 un Security Council, Resolution 1617 (29 July 2005), un Doc. s/res/1617, para. 4. See also 
un Security Council, Resolution 2083 (17 December 2012), un Doc. s/res/2083, para. 11 
(reaffirming the duty to provide a statement of case including the reasons for the listing).
64 un Security Council, Resolution 1904 (17 December 2009), un Doc. s/res/1904, para. 14. 
See also un Security Council, Resolution 2083, 17 December 2012, un Doc. s/res/2083, 
1267 of 199955 and split into two separate committees in 2011,56 held five times 
as many informal, unrecorded consultations as formal meetings.57 Moreover, 
none of the sanctions committees directly informs the individuals and entities 
concerned of their listing (let alone of the reasons for the listing), instead rely-
ing on member states to notify the targets of sanctions.58 Yet even notification 
of member states by the committees is often inadequate.59 As a consequence, 
there have been instances when designated individuals and entities have re-
portedly learned about their listing from non-official sources.60
In response to criticism regarding the secretive nature of the working 
 methods of its sanctions committees, the Security Council has repeatedly 
encouraged them to enhance the transparency of their decision-making. For 
example, the Security Council has suggested that committees publish their 
work on the Internet, make summary records of their formal meetings publicly 
available, and prepare annual reports on their activities.61 The 1267 Commit-
tee, in 2004, called upon states that propose individuals or groups for inclu-
sion on its sanctions list to provide, to the greatest extent possible, information 
about their connection with Al-Qaida or the Taliban.62 In 2005, it introduced 
a requirement that such states “shall provide to the Committee a statement 
of case describing the basis of the proposal”.63 Yet the Committee still used to 
give no reasons for its decisions to list or (not) delist individuals or groups. This 
only changed with Security Council Resolution 1904 of 2009, which directed 
the Committee to make accessible on its website ‘narrative summaries of rea-
sons for listing’ the respective individuals and entities on its sanctions list.64  
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 para. 14 (welcoming the efforts to make accessible a narrative summary of reasons for 
listings).
65 Anne Peters, ‘Article 25’ in Bruno Simma et al. (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: 
A Commentary (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) p. 787, para. 56.
66 Bernd Martenczuk, Rechtsbindung und Rechtskontrolle des Weltsicherheitsrats: Die Über-
prüfung nichtmilitärischer Zwangsmassnahmen durch den Internationalen Gerichtshof 
(Duncker und Humblot, Berlin, 1996) pp. 129–133.
Nevertheless, the Committee is still not obliged to publish fully reasoned deci-
sions, which would specify the supporting evidence.
2 Legal Limits on the Security Council
There is a whole range of reasons why the Security Council’s obscure working 
methods, and the lack of a duty to explain the voting behaviour in particu-
lar, may be regarded, in terms of policy, as inappropriate or unwise. From a 
legal point of view, however, this lack of transparency is only problematic if 
the Security Council and/or its individual members are subject to legal limits 
at all and if there are ways of reviewing compliance with these legal limits. 
This Section shows that such legal limits and means of review indeed exist. 
The Security Council’s actions must comply with a range of legal obligations 
(Section 2.1). Different bodies and entities can review whether they do or not 
(Section 2.2). Similarly, when voting in the Council, its members are bound to 
respect a number of legal obligations (Section 2.3), and there are various ways 
in which their voting behaviour can be reviewed (Section 2.4).
2.1 Legal Limits on Security Council (In)action
Are there any legal limits to what the most powerful, quintessentially political 
organ of the United Nations can do? Article 25 of the un Charter states that 
“[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the de-
cisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.” This 
provision could be understood to mean that only those decisions that are in 
accordance with the Charter are binding, while other decisions need not be 
carried out. According to this—what Anne Peters calls “radical”65—inter-
pretation of Article 25, it seems clear that there are legal limits on Security 
Council action. However, there are other plausible interpretations of Article 
25, and the travaux préparatoires are not conclusive.66 Therefore, the question 
as to the limitations to the Council’s powers must be answered having regard, 
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69 See e.g. Gabriel H. Oosthuizen, ‘Playing the Devil’s Advocate: The United Nations Security 
Council is Unbound by Law’ (1999) 12 Leiden Journal of International Law p. 521; Michael 
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Wrongful Sanctions (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) pp. 54–56; Dapo Akande, ‘The 
International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is There Room for Judicial Con-
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71 Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the 
Charter), 28 May 1948, International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, [1948] icj Rep 
p. 57, p. 64.
72 Prosecutor v. Tadić, 2 October 1995, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, Case No it-94-1-ar72, para. 28.
not only to Article 25, but the whole Charter and on the basis of principled 
considerations.67
Hans Kelsen argued in 1951 that, as the preserver of international peace and 
security, “the Security Council is not bound strictly to comply with existing 
law.”68 A minority of authors still take the position that the Council’s powers 
are unlimited.69 Today’s majority view, however, is that, given that the Secu-
rity Council is an organ established by a treaty, it must act within certain legal 
limits.70 The International Court of Justice (‘icj’) stated already in 1947 that 
“[t]he political character of an organ cannot release it from the observance of 
treaty provisions established by the Charter when they constitute limitations 
on its powers or criteria for its judgment.”71 It was, however, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (‘icty’), in the famous Tadić case, 
which best summarized the now prevalent position:
The Security Council is an organ of an international organization, es-
tablished by a treaty which serves as a constitutional framework for that 
organization. The Security Council is thus subjected to certain constitu-
tional limitations, however broad its powers under the constitution may 
be … [N]either the text nor the spirit of the Charter conceives of the Se-
curity Council as legibus solutus (unbound by law).72
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73 Anne Peters, ‘Article 24’ in Bruno Simma et al. (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: 
A Commentary (3rd ed) (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) p. 761, paras. 36–40.
74 Peters, Article 25 un Charter, supra note 65, paras. 209–211.
75 See e.g. David Schweigman, The Authority of the Security Council under Chapter vii of the 
un Charter: Legal Limits and the Role of the International Court of Justice (Kluwer Law In-
ternational, The Hague, 2001) pp. 197–201; Tzanakopoulos, supra note 70, pp. 70–72; Erika 
de Wet and André Nollkaemper, ‘Review of Security Council Decisions by National Courts’ 
(2002) 45 German Yearbook of International Law pp. 181–184. But see Evelyne Lagrange, ‘Le 
Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies peut-il violer le droit international?’ (2004) 2 Revue 
belge de droit international pp. 582–585; and Bernd Martenczuk, ‘The Security Council, the 
International Court and Judicial Review: What Lessons from Lockerbie?’ (1999) 10 European 
Journal of International Law pp. 545–546.
76 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina. v. Serbia and Montenegro), 13 September 1993, International 
Court of Justice, Provisional Measures, Order, separate opinion by Lauterpacht, J., [1993] 
icj Rep p. 325, para. 100:
The concept of jus cogens operates as a concept superior to both customary interna-
tional law and treaty. The relief which Article 103 of the Charter may give the Security 
Council in case of conflict between one of its decisions and an operative treaty obliga-
tion cannot—as a matter of simple hierarchy of norms—extend to a conflict between 
a Security Council resolution and jus cogens. Indeed, one only has to state the opposite 
proposition thus—that a Security Council resolution may even require participation 
in genocide—for its unacceptability to be apparent.
Thus, it seems clear that the Security Council is subject to the law. From this it 
follows that, in principle, not only its actions but also its omissions may be ille-
gal. In exceptional cases, the Council may be under a legal obligation to take a 
decision, so that failure to act may amount to a violation of international law.73
It is also worth stressing that Article 103 of the un Charter is no obstacle to 
there being legal limits to Security Council action. As is clear from the word-
ing of this provision, it only applies to “the obligations of the Members of the 
United Nations”, not the Security Council itself. Moreover, it only concerns the 
relationship between obligations under the Charter and “obligations under 
any other international agreement”, but not obligations under customary in-
ternational law.74
What is still contentious, however, is what exactly the legal limits to 
the powers of the Security Council are. There is a nearly unanimous 
view in legal scholarship that, first of all, the Security Council may not 
violate norms of jus cogens as these are overriding norms of the inter-
national legal order binding all subjects of international law. When 
adopting the un Charter, member states could not derogate from these pe-
remptory norms.75 This view finds support in the case law of the icj,76 the 
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78 See e.g. Swiss Federal Supreme Court, 14 November 2007, 125 Entscheidungen des Sch-
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80 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from 
the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. uk), 14 April 1992, International 
Court of Justice, Provisional Measures, Order, dissenting opinion by Weeramantry, J., 
[1992] icj Rep p. 3, p. 171. See also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina. v. Serbia and Montenegro), 
13 September 1993, International Court of Justice, Provisional Measures, Order, separate 
opinion by Lauterpacht, J., [1993] icj Rep p. 325, para. 101 (arguing that the Security Coun-
cil must act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations in 
discharging its duties to maintain international peace and security).
81 Peters, Article 25 un Charter, supra note 65, para. 77.
82 Martenczuk, supra note 66, pp. 120–163; Tzanakopoulos, supra note 70, pp. 57–59; Peters, 
Article 25 un Charter, supra note 65, paras. 87–89.
83 Peters, Article 25 un Charter, supra note 65, para. 90.
84 De Wet, supra note 37, pp. 133–177; Tzanakopoulos, supra note 70, pp. 60–64; Talmon, su-
pra note 9, pp. 184–185.
former Court of First Instance of the European Communities (‘cfi’)77 and na-
tional courts.78
Second, it seems clear that the Security Council is bound by the purposes 
and principles of the United Nations.79 This legal limit to the Council’s powers 
is expressly contained in Article 24(2) of the Charter, which provides that “the 
Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of 
the United Nations.” As Judge Weeramantry of the icj has remarked, this duty 
“is imperative and the limits are categorically stated.”80 It seems beyond con-
tention that a decision of the Council that does not at least aspire to reach one 
of the purposes of the United Nations listed in Article 1 would be ultra vires and 
therefore illegal.81 However, these purposes are so broadly defined that almost 
any decision could be said to further it.
Third, many authors argue that, since international organizations are bound 
by their internal law, notably by their constituent instrument, not only the pur-
poses and principles but the entire un Charter constitutes a legal limit on Se-
curity Council action.82 According to this view, limits imposed on the Security 
Council by the Charter include the rules on competences,83 the obligation to 
determine the existence of a “threat to the peace” according to Article 39,84 
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86 Peters, Article 25 un Charter, supra note 65, paras. 120–121.
87 un Charter, Art 1, para. 3. See also un Charter, Art 55, para. c (stipulating that in order to 
create conditions of stability and well-being, the un shall promote universal respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms).
88 See e.g. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina. v. Serbia and Montenegro), 13 September 1993, Interna-
tional Court of Justice, Provisional Measures, Order, separate opinion by Lauterpacht, J., 
[1993] icj Rep p. 325, para. 101; Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v. Switzerland, 21 
June 2016, European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), App. No 5809/08, para. 139.
89 See e.g. de Wet and Nollkaemper, supra note 75, pp. 173–175.
90 Akande, supra note 70, pp. 323–324.
91 See e.g. Tzanakopoulos, supra note 70, pp. 72–79; Mehrdad Payandeh, ‘Rechtskontrolle des 
un-Sicherheitsrates durch staatliche und überstaatliche Gerichte’ (2006) 66 Zeitschrift für 
ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht pp. 46–47.
92 Akande, supra note 70, pp. 317–321.
as well as the obligation to take proportionate action in response to such a 
threat.85
Fourth, there is strong support for the position that the Security Council 
is bound to comply with human rights, at the very least those guaranteed by 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (‘udhr’).86 Doctrinally, there are 
different ways in which such a duty can be explained. One may, for example, 
point to the fact that among the purposes of the United Nations listed in Ar-
ticle 1 of the Charter, which according to Article 24(2) are binding on the Secu-
rity Council, is that of “promoting and encouraging respect for human rights 
and for fundamental freedoms”.87,88 Or one may point out that the United Na-
tions, by establishing a system of human rights protection, has created a legal 
expectation that its organs, including the Security Council, will themselves 
respect these rights.89 Or one may argue that the Council, as an organ of an 
organization endowed with international legal personality, must at least com-
ply with those human rights obligations that have become part of customary 
international law.90
A more contentious proposition is that, fifth, the Security Council is bound 
to comply, not only with jus cogens and human rights norms, but with the 
whole body of general international law, that is, all customary law and general 
principles of law.91 Some authors putting forth this proposition make refer-
ence to Article 1(1) of the Charter, which provides, as one of the purposes of 
the United Nations, that international disputes or situations that might lead 
to a breach of the peace are to be adjusted or settled “in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international law”.92 Other authors, in contrast, point 
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93 Martenczuk, supra note 75, pp. 544–546; Lagrange, supra note 75, pp. 578–582. This argu-
ment goes back to Hans Kelsen: Kelsen, supra note 68, pp. 294–295.
94 See Reisman, supra note 69, p. 92.
95 un Charter, Art 96, para. 2.
96 Akande, supra note 70, pp. 327–328.
out that “justice and international law” are only mentioned in the context of 
the peaceful settlement of disputes but not in that of collective measures un-
der Chapter vii, concluding that the Council must not comply with general 
international law when it is acting to maintain or restore international peace 
and security.93
2.2 Legal Review of Security Council (In)action
The question of legal limits to Security Council (in)action is to be distin-
guished from the question of whether it is possible to review if the Council 
stays within these limits. That the Council is bound by the law does not mean 
that there are mechanisms for reviewing its acts. On the other hand, the 
absence of specific control mechanisms in international law does not pre-
clude the possibility of it being bound. Nevertheless, the two questions are 
closely linked. For what is the point of legal limits if there is no one who 
could check whether they are complied with?94 And what, on the other hand, 
is the point of reviewing an act if there are no legal standards by which to 
judge it?
2.2.1 Review by Courts
There is not one central, superior judicial institution that would be charged 
with supervising the Security Council and that could quash its decisions. Nev-
ertheless, there are manifold ways in which the legality of Security Council 
action may be (and indeed is) reviewed by various courts and quasi-judicial 
bodies.
First, the icj may directly review the legality of a Security Council deci-
sion in an advisory proceeding. Article 96(1) of the un Charter authorizes the 
General Assembly and the Security Council to request the icj to give an ad-
visory opinion on any legal question. Other organs of the United Nations and 
specialized agencies may request advisory opinions on legal questions arising 
within the scope of their activities.95 The legality of action (to be) taken by 
the Security Council is undoubtedly a “legal question” in the sense of Article 
96.96 In addition, the legality of a Council decision can arise incidentally in 
advisory proceedings when the Court has to determine the legal consequences 
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98 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 21 June 1971, Interna-
tional Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, [1971] icj Rep p. 16, para. 89. See de Wet, supra 
note 37, pp. 34–41.
99 Statute of the International Court of Justice (26 June 1945), 1 unts p. 16, Art 34(1).
100 Akande, supra note 70, pp. 331–333.
101 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (us v. Iran), 24 May 1980, Interna-
tional Court of Justice, Judgment, icj Rep 3, para. 40.
102 See Akande, supra note 70, pp. 332–333, for this (and a further) example.
103 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from 
the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. uk), 14 April 1992, International 
Court of Justice, Provisional Measures, Order, dissenting opinion by Weeramantry, J., 
[1992] icj Rep p. 3, para. 38.
104 Prosecutor v. Tadić, 2 October 1995, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, Case No it-94-1-ar72, paras. 13–48. The Appeals Chamber of the Special Tri-
bunal for Lebanon refused to follow this approach, arguing it had no authority to review 
of Council action. This has in fact happened in the Certain Expenses opinion97 
and the Namibia opinion.98
Second, although the icj cannot directly review Security Council acts in 
contentious proceedings because only states can be parties to such proceed-
ings,99 an incidental review is possible. A case may arise between two or more 
states where a resolution of the Security Council is part of the law that the icj 
is called upon to apply. In such a situation, the Court may have to determine 
whether that resolution is valid in the first place.100 This is a question the Court 
is allowed to address, since it can consider any legal question that may be at 
issue between the parties of a dispute.101 One may imagine a number of differ-
ent scenarios where the Court would have to examine whether a given act of 
the Security Council is valid so as to be able to decide the case before it. If, for 
example, a boundary dispute between Iraq and Kuwait came before the icj, 
it would be required to examine whether the Security Council had in fact the 
power to establish the Boundary Commission that demarcated the boundary 
as it now exists.102 In the Lockerbie case, the icj did at least not exclude the 
possibility that it would review the legality of Security Council Resolution 748 
at the merits stage.103
Third, in its famous Tadić ruling, the icty incidentally reviewed—at 
length—the legality of the Security Council resolution by which it had been 
established, eventually affirming it.104 The International Criminal Tribunal for 
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lenges to the Jurisdiction and Legality of the Tribunal”, Case No stl-11-01/pt/ac/ar90.1, 
paras. 36–50. See, however, the separate and partially dissenting opinion by Baragwanath, 
J., paras. 45–81, arguing that the Tribunal does have the competence to judicially review 
the Council’s resolution.
105 Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, 18 June 1997, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Deci-
sion on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, Case No ictr-96-15-t, paras. 17–29.
106 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 
unts p. 90.
107 Gabriël H. Oosthuizen, ‘Some Preliminary Remarks on the Relationship between the En-
visaged International Criminal Court and the un Security Council’ (1999) 46 Netherlands 
International Law Review pp. 319–321.
108 Ibid., p. 322.
109 William A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) p. 301. See also Luigi Condorelli and Santiago Vil-
lalpando, ‘Referral and Deferral by the Security Council’ in Antonio Cassese et al. (eds), 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Volume i (Oxford 
Rwanda (‘ictr’) later did the same—although less extensively—in Prosecutor 
v. Joseph Kanyabashi.105
Fourth, the icc, according to Article 19(1) of its Statute,106 is entitled, and 
indeed obliged, to “satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought be-
fore it.” Based on this provision, the icc has the power to review the legality of 
two types of Security Council decisions, namely referral decisions according to 
Article 13(b) and deferral decisions according to Article 16 of the icc Statute. 
When the Security Council refers a situation to the icc, the Court must estab-
lish whether that referral respects the conditions laid down in Article 13(b) of 
the icc Statute. Thus, it has the competence to verify, at the very least, wheth-
er the Security Council has followed the correct voting procedure, whether 
it has acted under Chapter vii of the un Charter and made a determination 
according to Article 39 of the Charter, and whether it has indeed adopted a 
resolution referring the situation to the icc.107 Some authors suggest that the 
Court’s power to review referral decisions is limited to these ‘formal’ grounds 
of review and that it is not authorized to review them in substance, that is, to 
assess the grounds for the Council’s determination according to Article 39 of 
the Charter or for the referral of a situation to the Court.108 Others, in contrast, 
take the position that, while the Security Council undoubtedly enjoys wide 
discretion with regard to these determinations, it is still required to act within 
the limits of the purposes and principles of the Charter, so that “the Security 
Council cannot refer any situation to the Court.”109 Accordingly, the icc would 
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114 See e.g. Nada v. Switzerland, 12 September 2012, European Court of Human Rights, App. 
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be able to determine whether the Council has acted ultra vires.110 Similarly, the 
icc must satisfy itself that the request of the Security Council for the deferral 
of an investigation or prosecution is in compliance with the requirements of 
Article 16 of the icc Statute. Thus, the Court can verify whether the deferral 
request is contained in a Security Council resolution that has been adopted 
under  Chapter vii, following the correct voting procedure.111 It could arguably 
also review whether Article 16 is used—as its drafters seem to have intended—
on a case-by-case basis by reference to a particular situation rather than to 
grant, in advance, blanket immunity for a whole category of persons.112 Finally, 
also with regard to deferrals the icc could, according to some authors, review 
whether the Council has respected the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations and not acted ultra vires.113
Fifth, a number of other international (quasi-)judicial bodies have exam-
ined, at least indirectly, decisions of the Security Council when reviewing acts 
of member states that implement these decisions. Most of these decisions 
concern the imposition of sanctions. The European Court of Human Rights 
(‘ECtHR’) has repeatedly reviewed national acts implementing Security Coun-
cil decisions.114 In al-Dulimi v. Switzerland, for example, a Chamber of the 
ECtHR held that action taken by a state in compliance with a sanctions regime 
 33 A Duty to Give Reasons in the Security Council 
international organizations law review 14 (2017) 13-86
<UN>
115 Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v. Switzerland, 26 November 2013, European 
Court of Human Rights, App. No 5809/08, para. 114, <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001 
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116 Ibid., paras. 118–122.
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Human Rights, Grand Chamber, App. No 5809/08, para. 139.
118 Ibid., para. 151.
119 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 
1969, 999 unts p. 171.
120 Sayadi and Vinck v. Belgium, 29 December 2008, Human Rights Committee, Communica-
tion No 1472/2006 (un Doc. CCPRlC/94/d/1472/2006).
121 Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission, 21 
September 2005, Court of First Instance of the European Communities, Case t-306/01, 
ecr ii-03533, paras. 277–281; Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council and Commission, 21 Septem-
ber 2005, Court of First Instance of the European Communities, Case t-315/01, ecr ii-
03649, paras. 226–230.
122 Kadi and Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council, 3 September 2008, European Court of Justice, 
Joined Cases c-402/05 P and c-415/05 P, ecr i-06351, para. 326. Although the ecj claimed 
of the Security Council will only be justified if that regime “protects fundamen-
tal rights in a manner which can be considered at least equivalent to that for 
which the Convention provides”.115 In the view of the Chamber, the sanctions 
regime against the former Iraqi government under Resolution 1483 did not 
meet this requirement.116 The Grand Chamber observed that “where a State 
relies on the need to apply a Security Council resolution in order to justify a 
limitation on the rights guaranteed by the Convention, it is necessary for the 
Court to examine the wording and scope of the text of the resolution in order 
to ensure, effectively and coherently, that it is consonant with the Conven-
tion.”117 It concluded that, when implementing a Council resolution requiring 
the listing of individuals, states must, at the very least, allow those individuals 
to submit evidence to a court to seek to show that their inclusion on the list 
has been arbitrary.118 The un Human Rights Committee, in Sayadi and Vinck 
v. Belgium, reviewed national measures implementing Security Council Reso-
lution 1267 and subsequent related resolutions for their conformity with the 
rights guaranteed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(‘iccpr’),119 finding a violation of Articles 12 and 17.120 In the Kadi/Yusuf cas-
es, the cfi applied a relaxed review of the sanctions regime established by 
Resolution 1267, checking its lawfulness with regard to jus cogens,121 while the 
European Court of Justice (‘ecj’) performed a full-fledged review of the imple-
menting regulation of the European Union (‘eu’) and, thereby, indirectly of 
the sanctions regime imposed by the Security Council.122
Moeckli and Fasel
international organizations law review 14 (2017) 13-86
<UN>
34
 that it is not reviewing the relevant Security Council resolutions (paras. 286–287), it 
was only able to make that claim because it assumed that the European Community 
had a freedom of choice with regard to implementation (para. 298), which is a highly 
problematic assumption. See Larissa van den Herik and Nico Schrijver, ‘Eroding the Pri-
macy of the un System of Collective Security: The Judgment of the European Court of 
Justice in the Cases of Kadi and Al Barakaat’ (2008) 5 International Organizations Law 
Review p. 335.
123 De Wet and Nollkaemper, supra note 75, p. 192.
124 Milosevic v. The Netherlands, 31 August 2001, The Hague District Court, Judgment in inter-
locutory injunction proceedings, trans. in (2001) 48 Netherlands International Law Review 
p. 357.
125 Swiss Federal Supreme Court, 3 September 2001, 1a.129/2001.
126 See e.g. Swiss Federal Supreme Court, 14 November 2007, 133 bge ii 450; Abdelrazik v. 
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127 Eric Suy, ‘The Role of the United Nations General Assembly’ in Georges Abi-Saab (ed), 
The Changing Constitution of the United Nations (British Institute of International & Com-
parative Law, London, 1997) pp. 55, 64.
Sixth, domestic courts may be required to review, as an incidental question, 
the legality of a Security Council resolution. They can do so, for example, when 
an action contesting the adoption of a domestic measure implementing the 
resolution itself is brought, when a tort action against the state is brought, or 
when criminal proceedings are instituted against individuals placed on one of 
the Council’s terrorist sanctions lists.123 Cases in which domestic courts were 
required to review the validity of Security Council action have included, for 
example, challenges to the Council’s power to establish the icty,124 to the con-
formity of the procedures of the ictr with fair trial standards,125 and to the 
compatibility of national measures implementing the terrorist sanctions re-
gime with various human rights guarantees.126
2.2.2 Review by Other Bodies and Entities
Not only various courts, but also a number of other bodies and entities may re-
view decisions of the Security Council for their compliance with international 
law.
First and foremost, as is made clear by Article 24(1) of the un Charter, the 
Security Council, in fulfilling its responsibility for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security, acts on behalf of the entire membership of the 
United Nations. Thus, the Council is accountable to the members: they have “a 
right of supervision on how this responsibility is exercised on their behalf.”127 
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132 Resolution adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African 
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Within the organization, the primary means of ensuring this accountability 
are the annual and special reports that Article 24(3) of the un Charter oblig-
es the Council to submit to the General Assembly, in which all members are 
represented. According to Article 15(1) of the Charter, “these reports shall in-
clude an account of the measures that the Security Council has decided upon 
or taken to maintain international peace and security.”128 While originally the 
Council’s annual reports were mainly descriptive, there have recently been 
several efforts to make them more informative and analytical.129 This reflects 
an understanding among member states that, in order to fulfil their account-
ability function, the reports must contain explanations for the decisions taken 
(or not taken).130 The General Assembly is only able to scrutinize the Security 
Council’s acts (and omissions), including for their conformity with interna-
tional law, if the Council explains the reasons for them.131 While the General 
Assembly can thus review the legality of Council action, it does not have the 
power to adopt any political or legal sanctions against it upon a report.
Regional organizations of states may also check the lawfulness of Securi-
ty Council action. In 1998, for instance, the Assembly of the Heads of State 
and Government of the Organization of African Unity adopted a resolution 
declaring that it would no longer comply with the Security Council resolu-
tions imposing sanctions against Libya, “owing to the fact that the said resolu-
tions violate Article 27 paragraph 3, Article 33 and Article 36 paragraph 3 of 
the United Nations Charter.”132 While not directly threatening disobedience, 
also the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has engaged in legal 
review of Security Council action. In 2008, it passed a resolution in which it 
found that the targeted sanctions system established by the Council in no way 
fulfils the minimum standards of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(‘echr’) and the iccpr and thus “violate[s] the fundamental principles of hu-
man rights and the rule of law”. Accordingly, it urged the Council “to overhaul 
the procedural and substantive rules governing targeted sanctions.”133
Finally, can individual member states review decisions of the Security 
Council for their compliance with international law and, if they find them to 
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be illegal, refuse to carry them out? Some scholars argue that they can. There 
are different ways of justifying this position. As explained above, adopting a 
‘radical’ interpretation of Article 25 of the Charter, one may argue that the 
member states are only obliged to comply with those decisions of the Council 
that are “in accordance with the present Charter” and are thus free to disobey 
those decisions that are not.134 Or one may assert that a Council decision in 
violation of international law constitutes an internationally wrongful act, en-
gaging the responsibility of the United Nations. Disobedience by a state could 
then be qualified as a countermeasure, precluding wrongfulness.135 Or, finally, 
one may assert that a state may lawfully resist a Security Council resolution if 
it has exhausted all mechanisms available for establishing the illegality of that 
resolution and its view is supported at least by part of the international com-
munity.136 All three positions presuppose that it is possible and appropriate for 
states to determine the legality of a given Security Council decision.137
2.3 Legal Limits on States’ Voting Behaviour in the Security Council
Not only the acts and omissions of the Security Council as a collective organ, 
but also those of its individual members are subject to legal limits. When a 
state participates in the decision-making process of an international organiza-
tion, this can be qualified as an act of that state which may entail its interna-
tional responsibility. At least as long as they act under instructions from their 
home government, the voting behaviour of state representatives in interna-
tional organizations is attributable to their state.138 As the Permanent Court of 
International Justice observed with regard to the Council of the League of Na-
tions, this body was “composed of representatives of Members, that is to say, of 
persons delegated by their respective Governments, from whom they receive 
instructions and whose responsibility they engage.”139 This equally applies to 
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votes in the Security Council, which are cast by government representatives 
who are subject to instructions. The vote in the decision-making organ of an 
international organization is thus attributable to the member state.140
The decision adopted as a result of the votes cast, in contrast, constitutes 
collective conduct of the organ that is attributable to the international organi-
zation. It is for this reason that the icj, in its judgment in Application of the In-
terim Accord of 13 September 1995 (The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. 
Greece), made a clear distinction between, on the one hand, Greece’s objection 
to the admission of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (‘fyrom’) to 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (‘nato’) and, on the other, nato’s de-
cision to defer the invitation to the fyrom to join nato.141 Having concluded 
that the conduct of Greece within this international organization “can be as-
sessed independently of nato’s decision”,142 the icj reviewed Greece’s objec-
tion in light of its treaty obligations towards the fyrom.
It is true that according to Article 59(2) of the Articles on the Responsibility 
of International Organizations (‘ario’) of the International Law Commission 
(‘ilc’),
[a]n act by a State member of an international organization done in ac-
cordance with the rules of the organization does not as such engage the 
international responsibility of that State under the terms of this article.143
However, such acts may fall under the regime of state responsibility instead. 
The ilc has explicitly recognized in its Commentary to the ario that the fact 
that a state does not incur responsibility under the regime of international or-
ganization responsibility “does not imply that the State would then be free to 
ignore its international obligations”. “These obligations”, the ilc Commentary 
continues, “may well encompass the conduct of a State when it acts within 
Moeckli and Fasel
international organizations law review 14 (2017) 13-86
<UN>
38
144 Ibid., commentary to Art 58(5) (which also applies to Art 59).
145 Naert, supra note 138, p. 164; Palchetti, supra note 140, pp. 356–362.
146 Anne Peters, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Spelling Out the Hard Legal Consequences for 
the un Security Council and Its Members’ in Ulrich Fastenrath et al. (eds), From Bilater-
alism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Bruno Simma (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2011) p. 297, at p. 314 (‘Spelling Out’). See also Anne Peters, ‘The Security Council’s 
Responsibility to Protect’ (2011) 8 International Organizations Law Review pp. 24–25.
147 un General Assembly, 56th Session, 25th plenary meeting (15 October 2001), un Doc. 
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Art 4), 28 May 1948, International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, dissenting opinion 
by Basdevant, Winiarski, McNair and Read, jj., [1948] icj Rep p. 57, pp. 91–92:
[T]he members of the Security Council, in whatever capacity they may be there, are 
participating in the action of an organ which in the discharge of its primary responsi-
bility for the maintenance of international peace and security is acting on behalf of all 
the Members of the United Nations.
an international organization”, breach of which would entail responsibility ac-
cording to the ilc Articles on State Responsibility.144
The voting behaviour of a state in an international organization is thus 
not only attributable to that state, but it can also constitute a breach of an 
international obligation of that state. Whether a vote will entail international 
responsibility will depend on the scope and nature of a given obligation, in 
particular on whether it imposes a particular course of action on the state in 
the decision-making process of an international organization.145 For the pres-
ent context, the most important treaties imposing on states a particular voting 
behaviour in international organizations are the un Charter and human rights 
treaties.
2.3.1 Legal Limits Arising under the un Charter
When the members of the Security Council participate in debates and votes in 
the Council, they do not only represent their respective states but also act as 
part of an organ of the United Nations. More than that, the Security Council 
has a restricted membership and acts, according to Article 24(1) of the Charter, 
“on behalf” of all members of the United Nations. Therefore, the members rep-
resented in the Council have a special responsibility towards the other mem-
bers of the organization.146 The representative of Costa Rica put it as follows 
in the General Assembly:
In accordance with the provisions of the Charter, the Security Council 
acts on behalf of all Members of the United Nations. Its members, wheth-
er permanent or elected, represent equally all States Members of the 
Organization and they are, therefore, responsible to them.147
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D. White, ‘Decision-Making’ in Jan Klabbers and Åsa Wallendahl (eds), Research Hand-
book on the Law of International Organizations (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2011) p. 225, 
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The members of the Council act as delegates of all other members of the Unit-
ed Nations and can in this sense be characterized as “trustees of the interna-
tional community”.148
The rights of participation in the Security Council thus serve the funda-
mental values of the international community. Accordingly, they may not be 
exercised in a manner that would undermine these very values. In other words, 
the voting rights of the members of the Security Council, as “trustees of the in-
ternational community”, may not be exercised arbitrarily but instead are sub-
ject to (legal) limits, even though these may be widely drawn.149
As a very minimum, when voting in the Security Council, the Council mem-
bers must comply with their obligation under Article 2(2) of the un Charter 
to act in good faith. This legal limit on the voting behaviour in the Council has 
been recognized by the judges of the icj Basdevant, Winiarski, McNair, and 
Read in their dissenting opinion in the advisory opinion on Conditions of Ad-
mission. While acknowledging that, when voting in the Council, its members 
have “the right and the duty to take into account all the political considerations 
which are in their opinion relevant to a decision”,150 they held that they do not 
enjoy unlimited freedom but must use their voting power “in good faith, in 
accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Organization and in such 
a manner as not to involve any breach of the Charter”.151 The disagreement be-
tween the judges in the Admission case did not relate to this specific issue: all 
of them agreed “that the discretion inherent in the right to vote must be exer-
cised in good faith”.152 Jean Spiropoulos has similarly argued that, although the 
members of the Council have a wide discretionary power in exercising their 
functions, “[l]eur pouvoir discrétionnaire devient une illégalité lorsqu’il est exercé 
de façon abusive.”153 Any vote not given in good faith constitutes, according to 
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Spiropoulos, such an abuse of power.154 Robert Kolb has pointed out that any 
margin of discretion in voting in the Council is limited by the obligation to act 
in good faith and that even the power to veto, despite its eminently political 
nature, remains subject to the legal order and may not be abused.155 This is 
reflected in un practice, for example in the joint statement made by the great 
powers in San Francisco in defence of the Yalta Formula, according to which 
“[i]t is not to be assumed … that the permanent members, any more than the 
non-permanent members, would use their ‘veto’ power wilfully to obstruct the 
operation of the Council.”156 In its Uniting for Peace resolution, the General 
Assembly refers to “the duty of the permanent members … to exercise restraint 
in the use of the veto.”157
Accordingly, the exercise of the right to vote in the Council will amount to a 
breach of the obligation to act in good faith if it undermines the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations.158 Most importantly, the Council members 
are obliged to employ their vote in a manner that coincides with the primary 
purpose of the organization, maintenance of international peace and securi-
ty.159 Thus, it has convincingly been argued, a vote cast by a Council member 
that has nothing to do with this purpose would be illegal.160 An example of 
such an exercise of the voting right is the veto cast by China in 1997 against a 
draft resolution authorizing the sending of military observers to Guatemala, 
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on the basis that Guatemala had recognized the government of Taiwan.161  
In 1999, China blocked the extension of the United Nations Preventive Deploy-
ment Force (‘unpredep’) to Macedonia for similar reasons. In the view of the 
Canadian representative, China’s voting behaviour was “compelled by bilateral 
concerns unrelated to unpredep” and thus “constitute[d] an unfortunate and 
inappropriate use of the veto.”162 But also a concurring vote may violate the ob-
ligation to act in good faith. If, for example, a Council member voted in favour 
of a request by the Security Council for deferral of an investigation or prosecu-
tion according to Article 16 of the icc Statute so that a person is unduly kept 
in custody without a trial, rather than with a view to the purposes laid down in 
Chapter vii of the Charter,163 this would amount to an abuse of power.
2.3.2 Legal Limits Arising under Other Treaties
Apart from the obligation arising under Article 2(2) of the un Charter, the 
members of the Security Council are also bound by other international trea-
ties ratified by them when voting in the Council. For example, Council mem-
bers that are parties to the icc Statute may not act contrary to its terms when 
 exercising their voting rights in the Council.164 Similarly, human rights and 
 humanitarian law treaties, such as the iccpr, the echr, the Genocide Con-
vention,165 and the Geneva Conventions,166 may require Council members to 
vote in a specific way on certain proposed resolutions.
As a general rule, human rights obligations are owed to all individuals 
subject to the jurisdiction of the state party concerned.167 With regard to the 
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Committee has repeatedly pointed out that states parties of the icescr have an obli-
gation to ensure that their actions as members of international organizations (in par-
ticular international financial institutions) take due account of the rights guaranteed 
echr, the ECtHR ruled in Matthews v. United Kingdom that its “Article 1 makes 
no distinction as to the type of rule or measure concerned, and does not ex-
clude any part of the member States’ ‘jurisdiction’ from scrutiny under the 
Convention.”168 The Court held that a decision of the Council of the European 
Communities constituted an international instrument that was freely entered 
into by the United Kingdom, so that the United Kingdom was responsible for 
its consequences.169 Thus, unlike as is the case with acts that a state is obliged 
to adopt due to its membership of an international organization,170 a state is 
responsible under Article 1 of the echr for the consequences of its voting be-
haviour in an international body such as the Council of the European Commu-
nities and thus bound by the substantive obligations of the echr.171 The Court 
confirmed this view in the Segi case. There, it stated that by taking part in the 
preparation and adoption of Common Foreign and Security Policy (‘cfsp’) de-
cisions, which are taken by unanimity or qualified majority, each eu member 
state engages its responsibility.172 In our view, the same must apply with regard 
to the voting behaviour in the Security Council.173 Furthermore, there is no 
apparent reason why states should not be equally bound under human rights 
treaties other than the echr.174
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Article 103 of the un Charter does not constitute an obstacle to the voting 
behaviour in the Security Council being subject to obligations under human 
rights treaties. Article 103 only concerns the situation where there is a conflict 
between member states’ obligations under the Charter and their obligations 
under human rights treaties. Yet, while such a conflict may arise as a conse-
quence of the adoption of a legally binding Security Council resolution, there 
is no conflict prior to its adoption, including at the voting stage where Council 
members have discretion as to how to vote.175 The ECtHR, in contrast, held in 
Behrami and Saramati that the vote of a permanent member of the Council in 
favour of the Chapter vii resolution at issue was not subject to its scrutiny. The 
Court argued that if it were to adjudicate on the legality of votes in favour of 
a particular Council resolution, it would hamper the effective conduct of the 
United Nations’ operations and interfere with its mission to secure interna-
tional peace and security.176 This finding, however, is not convincing. It cannot 
be reconciled with the Court’s previous jurisprudence concerning the respon-
sibility of member states of an international organization177 and is not sup-
ported by any legal explanation but only some unspecified assumptions about 
the alleged negative impact of human rights obligations on the effectiveness of 
the system of collective security.178
The obligations that may arise under human rights and humanitarian law 
treaties with regard to the voting behaviour are manifold. For instance, Coun-
cil members are required to vote against a Security Council resolution that 
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grants un forces blanket powers and absolves them from complying with hu-
man rights guarantees.179 Similarly, when the Council establishes a system of 
targeted sanctions, Council members are obliged to use their vote in a way 
that ensures that the necessary substantive and procedural safeguards for the 
protection of human rights are built into the system.180 The members of such 
a sanctions committee of the Security Council may have to vote against the 
listing of certain individuals or, conversely, in favour of their delisting.181 Fi-
nally, it may be argued that Council members are under an obligation to vote 
in favour of (or at least not against) a resolution authorizing action that would 
be able to prevent, or bring an end to, genocide, crimes against humanity, or 
war crimes.182
2.4 Legal Review of States’ Voting Behaviour in the Security Council
The voting behaviour of the members of the Security Council can be reviewed 
for its compliance with the legal limits set out in Section 2.3 in a number of 
different ways.
There is, first of all, the possibility of a review by the icj. The General As-
sembly or the Security Council itself can request an advisory opinion from the 
Court on the question of whether a vote in the Council amounts to a violation 
of international law. Undoubtedly, this constitutes a legal question in the sense 
of Article 96 of the Charter.183
Furthermore, the icj has confirmed that contentious proceedings can be 
brought against a state for its participation in the decision-making process of 
nato.184 There is no reason why the same should not apply with regard to 
the un Security Council. Thus, a state can institute contentious proceedings 
before the Court against a Council member, claiming that a vote cast by that 
member does not comply with the legal limits explained above or even trying 
to prevent it from voting in a specific manner.185 This is, in fact, exactly what 
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Libya did in the Lockerbie case: Libya requested the icj to adopt provisional 
measures against the United Kingdom and the United States, arguing that such 
measures were urgently required to refrain them “from taking any initiative 
within the Security Council for the purpose of impairing that right to exercise 
jurisdiction, which Libya asks the Court to recognize.”186 Once Security Coun-
cil Resolution 748 had been adopted, Libya claimed that “the United Kingdom 
and the United States should so act as not to infringe Libya’s rights, for example 
by seeking a suspension of the relevant part of Resolution 748 (1992).”187 How-
ever, the Court never addressed the substance of these claims. Similarly, in 1993 
Bosnia and Herzegovina notified the icj in writing that it intended to institute 
proceedings against the United Kingdom for complicity in genocide, on the 
grounds that the United Kingdom had opposed efforts of other members in 
the Security Council to lift the arms embargo imposed on Bosnia and Herze-
govina. Bosnia and Herzegovina later dropped its plan to lodge the complaint, 
apparently in response to a pledge by the United Kingdom to increase humani-
tarian aid and to promote a negotiated political settlement.188
With specific regard to obligations under human rights treaties, the su-
pervisory bodies established by these treaties (such as the un Human Rights 
Committee and the ECtHR) can review the voting behaviour of those Security 
Council members that are parties to the respective treaty for compliance with 
the obligations under that treaty. This can occur, first, in the context of state 
reporting procedures, as far as the respective human rights treaty provides for 
such a procedure.189 Second, a state party to a human rights treaty could bring 
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an inter-state complaint against a Council member that is party to the same 
treaty, alleging that its vote in favour of a Security Council resolution that re-
sults in human rights violations breaches its obligation not to defeat the object 
and purpose of the treaty.190 Third—and, from a practical point of view, most 
importantly—a review of the voting behaviour is also possible in the context 
of an individual complaint. As a general rule, neither a Security Council resolu-
tion as such nor, therefore, votes contributing to its adoption can form the sub-
ject of an individual complaint: Security Council resolutions are typically not 
‘self-executing’ (that is, they do not have a direct effect in domestic law) but 
need to be implemented by states, so that individuals will normally lack the 
victim status required to bring an individual complaint.191 What an individual 
can claim, however, is that a measure by a state party implementing a Security 
Council resolution violates the respective human rights treaty. If the state, at 
the time of the adoption of the resolution, had been a member of the Council 
and now tried to invoke Article 103 of the un Charter as a justification for the 
implementing measure, the supervisory body would have to review its voting 
behaviour. If the state had voted in favour of the resolution, the obligation not 
to defeat the object and purpose of the human rights treaty would bar it from 
invoking Article 103 of the Charter.192
2.5 Conclusion
The Security Council does not operate in a legal vacuum. Neither is the Council 
completely free to act as it wants, nor are the Council members completely 
free to decide how to vote. Both (in)action of the Security Council as a collec-
tive body and the voting behaviour of its individual members are subject to 
legal limits. Compliance with these legal limits imposed on the Council and 
the members can be reviewed in various ways.
However, a meaningful legal review of the Security Council’s acts (or omis-
sions) and of the votes of its members is only possible if the reviewing body 
or entity knows the reasons for them. Not only what the Council decides must 
be subject to legal limits, but also how it decides. In Section 3 we will argue 
that, in certain situations, the Security Council and its members are already 
today obliged to give reasons for their decisions and votes, respectively. In Sec-
tion 4 we sketch out a proposal to introduce, de lege ferenda, a comprehensive 
duty to explain in a public meeting every vote cast in the Security Council. 
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Providing explanations for decisions and votes would be in the best interest of 
the Council and its members themselves: without explanations, the reviewing 
body or entity will be more likely to come to the conclusion that the respective 
decisions or votes are not supported by sufficient reasons and are thus illegal.
3 A Duty to Give Reasons—De Lege Lata
In certain situations, there is already today, de lege lata, an obligation incum-
bent on the Security Council to give reasons for its decisions and, respectively, 
on its members to explain their votes in the Council, although this duty is not 
implemented. In particular, a duty to give reasons may arise, first, from the due 
process rights guaranteed by international human rights law (Section 3.1) and, 
second, from the responsibility to protect (Section 3.2).
3.1 Due Process Rights under International Human Rights Law
As part of the expansion of its scope of activity, the Security Council has start-
ed to adopt more and more measures that directly affect specific individuals, 
groups, or corporate entities. The Council thus increasingly assumes functions 
that are normally performed by courts or administrative bodies.
When the Council acts in a manner that directly affects important inter-
ests of non-state actors, the due process guarantees provided by international 
human rights law become applicable. As pointed out in Section 2.1, there are 
compelling reasons to assume that the Security Council is bound to respect 
human rights. This applies all the more so with regard to the rights building 
the focus of the present analysis, the rights to a fair hearing and an effective 
remedy. These rights belong to a universal minimum standard of due process 
which can be considered as forming part of customary international law and 
as also being protected by general principles of law in the meaning of Article 
38(1)(c) of the icj Statute.193
The right to be informed about the reasons for a decision affecting indi-
vidual interests is one of the key due process rights under international human 
rights law. This right is rooted in the right to a fair hearing as it is guaranteed 
by Article 10 of the udhr, Article 14(1) of the iccpr, Article 6(1) of the echr, 
Article 8(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights (‘achr’),194 and 
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Article 7(1) of the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘achpr’).195 
The right to a fair hearing does not only apply in criminal proceedings but in 
all proceedings concerning the determination of a person’s “rights and obli-
gations in a suit at law”196 or “civil rights and obligations”,197 which includes 
certain administrative proceedings.198 It requires decision-makers to “indicate 
with sufficient clarity the grounds on which they based their decision,”199 al-
though not every point raised in argument must be dealt with.200 Only if a 
reasoned decision is given is it possible for the individual concerned to know 
that his or her arguments have been properly examined and to exercise any 
available right of appeal, and only then can the public scrutinize the adminis-
tration of justice.201
The right to learn the reasons of a decision also follows from the right to 
have an effective remedy. Article 8 of the udhr, Article 2(3) of the iccpr, 
Article 13 of the echr, and Article 25 of the achr all provide that everyone 
whose rights have been violated shall have an effective remedy. A remedy may, 
however, only be characterized as ‘effective’ if the person concerned or, at the 
very least, the body that reviews the impugned act is informed about the rea-
sons behind it; it is only possible to understand and review an act if one knows 
the reasons for it.202 Thus, the ECtHR has ruled that proceedings for reviewing 
a deportation order, in which the person concerned is only given an outline of 
the grounds for the deportation and the findings of the reviewing panel them-
selves are not disclosed, do not constitute an ‘effective’ remedy.203
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As far as the Security Council has assumed the role of a (criminal) court 
and created tribunals for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law, it has met its obligation to pro-
vide reasons for its decisions by transposing it on these tribunals. The statutes 
of the icty and the ictr, which were adopted by resolutions of the Security 
Council,204 both provide that judgments must be accompanied by a reasoned 
opinion in writing, to which separate or dissenting opinions may be append-
ed.205 Other decisions of the tribunals and orders of its judges must, as a gen-
eral rule, equally be supported by reasons.206
The situation is different, however, as far as the Security Council, taking on 
the role of an administrative body, has adopted other measures that directly af-
fect non-state actors. By far the most important of these are sanctions imposed 
by the Council that are targeted against specific individuals and non-state enti-
ties.207 Unlike as with the international criminal tribunals, the Council has so 
far failed to impose on its sanctions committees a duty to give reasons for their 
decisions.
There are currently 13 sanctions regimes imposed by the Security Council in 
place, each administered by its own sanctions committee, that is, a subsidiary 
body of the Council whose composition reflects its own.208 The oldest of the 
existing sanctions regimes, concerning Somalia, was established in 1992209 and 
the most recent, concerning South Sudan, in 2015.210 All of these regimes are 
designed to, among other things, designate specific individuals and non-state 
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entities as targets of sanctions,211 although in the case of one regime no one 
has actually been placed on the list so far.212 Usually, the measures imposed on 
the listed individuals and entities include a travel ban, an assets freeze, and an 
arms embargo.
In the case of most sanctions regimes, the listed individuals and entities are 
linked to the government of a country. This is not the case, however, with the 
sanctions regime established according to Security Council Resolution 1267 of 
1999, which targets individuals and entities belonging to, or associated with, 
Al-Qaida and/or the Taliban.213 Due to the high number of individuals and en-
tities subject to it, this sanctions regime, often simply referred to as ‘the terror-
ist sanctions regime’, has attracted the greatest attention.214
Given the great variety of sanctions regimes and the differences in the pro-
cedures that are applicable before them, it is difficult to make generalized 
statements about the compatibility of targeted sanctions with human rights 
guarantees. In particular, this will depend to a considerable extent on the na-
ture of the sanctions that are imposed on a given individual or entity. In cer-
tain cases, the effects of including a person or entity on a sanctions list may 
be sufficiently serious to amount to the determination of a “criminal charge”, 
triggering the fair hearing guarantees listed above.215 Even if such a qualifica-
tion is rejected, these guarantees will in most cases be applicable on the basis 
that listing concerns the determination of “rights and obligations in a suit at 
law” or “civil rights”, respectively, as the placing of a person on a publicly avail-
able sanctions list can be said to amount to an attack on his or her reputation 
and/or may entail an interference with property rights.216 Thus, the respective 
sanctions committee would have to provide a fair hearing, which, as explained 
above, includes the right to be informed about the reasons for a decision, in 
the present context the reasons for the listing. Even if one was to conclude 
that the guarantee of a fair hearing does not apply to targeted sanctions, listed 
individuals or entities would still have the right to an effective remedy against 
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the listing and its consequences. Any such remedy can only be qualified as ‘ef-
fective’, if the sanctions committee informs the reviewing body of the reasons 
that led to the listing, although these reasons must not necessarily be made 
publicly available.217
In short, when the Security Council establishes sanctions committees it 
should—just as it did in the case of the international criminal tribunals— 
impose on them a duty to give reasons for their listing decisions. There are two 
basic formats in which this duty can be implemented. Either the individual 
committee members are obliged to explain their positions with regard to the 
listing of individuals or entities in the committee meetings and the records of 
these meetings are made available to the public (or, at the very least, to the par-
ties concerned). Or the respective sanctions committee, acting as a collective 
body, provides reasons in writing for its listing decisions.
As explained in Section 1 above, neither has happened. The procedures of the 
sanctions committees are notoriously obscure. The committees mostly meet in 
informal consultations, which are not recorded. As far as formal meetings are 
held at all, they take place almost entirely behind closed doors, with their re-
cords not being published. None of the sanctions committees directly informs 
the individuals and entities concerned of their listing, let alone of the reasons 
for the listing. In 2009, the Security Council at least directed the 1267 Committee 
to make accessible on its website ‘narrative summaries of reasons for listing’ the 
respective individuals and entities, which are mainly based on information pro-
vided by the designating state(s).218 Some other committees now also publish 
such ‘narrative summaries’. Nevertheless, the sanctions committees are still not 
obliged to publish fully reasoned decisions specifying the supporting evidence.
This has, accordingly, been criticized by a number of courts in the context of 
the review of measures implementing Security Council resolutions, referred to 
in Section 2.2.1. The ecj, in Kadi and Al Barakaat, observed with regard to the Al 
Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime that the 1267 Committee was not required to 
inform the designated persons or entities of the reasons for listing them or re-
fusing to delist them.219 However, communication of the grounds for inclusion 
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on the list was required, first, so that the listed person could defend their rights 
in the best possible conditions and decide whether to bring legal proceedings 
and, second, in order to put the reviewing body fully in a position in which it 
may carry out the review of the lawfulness of the implementing measure.220 
The ecj concluded that the right to be heard and the right to effective judi-
cial review enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the echr221 “were patently not 
respected”.222 With regard to the Iraqi sanctions system, the ECtHR has ruled 
that those subject to an assets freeze as a consequence of their inclusion on 
the list established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1483 are entitled, 
in accordance with Article 6 of the echr, to have access to a court that has the 
power to verify whether their inclusion on the list was arbitrary.223 This would 
seem to imply a duty on behalf of the Sanctions Committee to give reasons for 
the listing, as otherwise a meaningful court challenge would not be possible.224 
Finally, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has passed a res-
olution stating that targeted sanctions imposed by the Security Council such 
as freezing of assets and travel restrictions must meet “minimum procedural 
standards under the rule of law”, which include “the right for everyone to be 
notified promptly and fully informed of the charges held against himself or 
herself, and of the decision taken and the reasons for that decision”.225 The 
Parliamentary Assembly strongly deplored that the individual or entity con-
cerned “is usually neither informed of the request, nor given the possibility to 
be heard, nor even necessarily informed about the decision taken.”226
3.2 Responsibility to Protect
Apart from the due process guarantees under international human rights law, 
also the so-called ‘responsibility to protect’ (‘r2p’) gives rise to an obligation of 
the Security Council to explain its decisions and of its members to give reasons 
for their voting behaviour.
The concept of r2p was developed by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (‘iciss’), which was established by the 
 Canadian government. In its report of 2001, the iciss set out the two  building 
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blocks of the concept.227 The first element is that state sovereignty implies re-
sponsibility, and the primary responsibility to protect populations lies with the 
territorial state. Second, however, “[w]here a population is suffering serious 
harm … and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the 
principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to pro-
tect.”228 The most important expression of a recognition of r2p by states is the 
General Assembly’s World Summit Outcome Document of 2005, in which the 
heads of state and government declared that
we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive man-
ner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, includ-
ing Chapter vii, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant 
regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inade-
quate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their pop-
ulations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity.229
The World Summit Outcome Document is also significant in that it limits the 
scope of r2p as it was originally set out by the iciss to the core international 
crimes as defined in Articles 6 to 8 of the icc Statute—that is, genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity (including ethnic cleansing).
The legal nature of r2p is contentious. While some states find it to be a 
“sophisticated normative legal framework based on international law”,230 oth-
ers describe it as a “political commitment”.231 The High-level Panel Report on 
Threats, Challenges and Change characterized r2p, and the corresponding 
obligation of the Security Council to take action in certain situations, as an 
“emerging norm”.232 Given that the concept of r2p rose so quickly and is still in 
a state of flux, one can probably not confidently say much more about its legal 
nature than to point out that “the concept currently encompasses a spectrum 
of different normative propositions that vary considerably in their status and 
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degree of legal support.”233 One proposition that finds very broad support is 
that the host state has the responsibility to protect populations on its territory 
from large-scale atrocities.234 Much more controversial is the proposition that 
the United Nations, acting through the Security Council, or other states have 
a positive obligation to intervene to protect populations under the concept of 
r2p.
The position that such an obligation is incumbent on the Security Council 
relies, first of all, on the premise that the Council is subject to certain legal 
limits, which, as explained in Section 2.1, notably include human rights. As also 
explained in that Section, not only the Council’s actions but also its omissions 
may be illegal: in certain situations, the Council is under a legal obligation to 
act. With regard to r2p this means that it could be argued that failure of the 
Security Council to authorize an intervention capable of protecting a popula-
tion from core crimes, such as genocide, constitutes an illegal act, triggering 
the responsibility of the United Nations.235
In support of the proposition that other states have a positive obligation to 
intervene in r2p situations, one may point out that virtually all states of the 
world are parties to the four Geneva Conventions and the great majority of 
states, including nearly all current Security Council members,236 are parties 
to the Genocide Convention. These treaties, which address two of the three 
categories of core crimes in which the concept of r2p is rooted, contain pro-
visions that are aimed at the prevention of their violation by other states.237 
The obligation incumbent on states parties to the Genocide Convention under 
Article 1 to prevent genocide does not presuppose a territorial link238 and will 
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to Protect (12 January 2009), un Doc. a/63/677, para. 26 (urging the p5 “to refrain from 
employing or threatening to employ the veto in situations of manifest failure to meet 
obligations relating to the responsibility to protect”); proposal for a General Assembly 
resolution by Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland (‘Small Five’, 
or ‘s5’), revised version, un General Assembly Draft Resolution (15 May 2012), un Doc. 
a/66/l.42/Rev.2, para. 20 (recommending the p5 to consider “[r]efraining from using a 
veto to block Council action aimed at preventing or ending genocide, war crimes and 
be  violated if, in the words of the icj, “the State manifestly failed to take all 
 measures to prevent genocide which were within its power, and which might 
have contributed to preventing the genocide.”239 Common Article 1 of the 
Geneva Conventions similarly obliges states parties “to respect and to ensure 
respect” for the Conventions, which means that every party “whether or not 
it is a party to a specific conflict, is under an obligation to ensure that the re-
quirements of the instruments in question are complied with.”240 The precise 
content of this positive obligation is, however, rather unclear and may vary 
from one state to another depending on parameters such as the capacity to 
influence effectively persons likely to commit core crimes, the relationship 
with the host state, and the extent of the harm occurring.241 Furthermore, the 
obligation may not have to be (or even may not be) discharged unilaterally, but 
rather through multilateral efforts to protect.
For members of the Security Council, this obligation to engage in coopera-
tive efforts to prevent core crimes could, in view of their special responsibil-
ity towards the international community,242 take the form of an obligation 
to vote in favour of a resolution authorizing an intervention.243 Accordingly, 
various states and international bodies have repeatedly called on the Council 
members, and especially the p5, not to block resolutions authorizing action 
designed to prevent, or bring an end to, mass atrocities.244
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 crimes against humanity”); statement by the representative of France at the 67th Session, 
6870th meeting of the Security Council (26 November 2012), un Doc. s/pv.6870, p. 15 (pro-
posal supporting the p5 “voluntarily and jointly foregoing the use of the veto in situations 
under the Council’s consideration in which mass atrocities are being committed and, 
more generally, which pertain to the responsibility to protect”); Recommendation of the 
European Parliament (18 April 2013), 2012/2143(ini) (proposing that the p5 adopt “a vol-
untary code of conduct which would limit the use of the right of veto in cases of genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity”); statement by the representa-
tive of France at the 68th Session, 7052nd meeting of the Security Council (29 October 
2013), un Doc. s/pv.7052, p. 13 (elaborating on the earlier French proposal by suggesting 
an alert mechanism to trigger the voluntary suspension of the veto right and suggesting 
that 50 un member states should be allowed to challenge the Security Council when they 
believe mass atrocities have occurred); un Security Council, 68th Session, 7052nd meeting 
(29 October 2013), un Doc. s/pv.7052, p. 20 (encouragement of the Accountability, Coher-
ence and Transparency Group (‘act’)—a cross-regional group of 22 states—to the p5 to 
explore the proposal made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs for France, Mr. Laurent 
Fabius, “that the five permanent members themselves voluntarily regulate their right to 
exercise a veto in the case of mass atrocity crimes”).
245 Peters, Spelling Out, supra note 146, p. 324.
246 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 26 February 2007, International Court 
of Justice, Judgment, [2007] icj Rep p. 43, para. 430 (with regard to genocide).
247 Zimmermann, Article 27 un Charter, supra note 175, para. 64.
248 Ibid., para. 65.
It would probably be premature to claim that this means that there is al-
ready now, de lege lata, a “hard and fast legal obligation”245 on the Security 
Council to authorize an intervention every time an r2p situation arises and/
or on the members of the Council to vote in favour of a proposed resolution 
authorizing such an intervention. What can be confidently asserted, however, 
is that the Security Council and its members may not remain completely inac-
tive in the face of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. Where a 
potential r2p situation arises, the Council and its members must at least con-
vene a meeting, assess the situation, consider the different options, and, finally, 
“employ all means reasonably available”246 to prevent the commission of core 
crimes.247 Council members may not block a resolution aimed at protecting a 
population from core crimes without at least having considered the relevant 
facts and positions or merely based on political reasons that are not directly 
related to the r2p situation at issue.248
In other words, where there is evidence that core crimes are being commit-
ted, or are about to be committed, there exists a legal presumption that the 
Security Council and its members may not simply ignore these crimes but 
 57 A Duty to Give Reasons in the Security Council 
international organizations law review 14 (2017) 13-86
<UN>
249 Verlage, supra note 235, p. 253.
250 Ibid., pp. 250–253.
251 Peters, Spelling Out, supra note 146, p. 323.
252 See e.g. Robert Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation: The Theory of Rational Discourse as 
Theory of Legal Justification (Ruth Adler and Neil MacCormick trans.) (Oxford University 
must take some action to fulfil their responsibility to protect.249 The rise of the 
r2p concept has thus led to a reversal of the burden of justification: in r2p situ-
ations, not intervention but inaction must be justified.250 If a Council member 
votes against a proposed resolution authorizing intervention, it must state its 
reasons for doing so. Due to their power to block a Security Council decision on 
their own, a particularly strict obligation to explain their voting behaviour is 
incumbent on the permanent members, whereas the requirements with regard 
to explanations given by non-permanent members are somewhat relaxed. This 
procedural obligation is an indispensable component of the r2p concept.251 
The perhaps most important merit of this concept is that it has developed a set 
of objective criteria to determine in which situations an intervention is called 
for and what standards it must meet. Only if the Council members are obliged 
to give reasons for their voting behaviour, is it possible to understand which of 
these criteria they think are (not) met and thus to assess whether the Security 
Council as an organ of the United Nations and its individual members live up 
to their responsibility to protect populations from core crimes.
4 A Duty to Give Reasons—De Lege Ferenda
In this last Section, we will first present the merits of a duty to give reasons for 
votes cast in the Security Council by elucidating the foundations this duty has 
in discourse theory and demonstrating the advantages it entails with regard to 
quality of decision-making, legal certainty, and accountability (Section 4.1). We 
shall then sketch out our proposal for a duty to give reasons and show how this 
duty could be implemented de lege ferenda (Section 4.2).
4.1 The Merits of Reason-Giving
4.1.1 Discourse Theory and the Rhetorical Community
Our proposal for a duty to give reasons for votes cast in the Security Council is 
based on a discourse theoretical approach that follows in the tradition of Jür-
gen Habermas’s theory of communicative action. This theory did not only have 
a major impact in political science but, more recently, it has also been applied 
to the legal realm.252 We draw on these legal accounts to present the specific 
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advantages of reason-giving in the context of the Security Council. In line with 
the discourse theoretical foundation of our approach, we adopt a constructiv-
ist view of international relations. We believe that the international sphere is, 
to a large extent, socially constructed, that is, created by intersubjective and 
institutionalized understandings. The identity, the interests, and therefore also 
the behaviour of states and other international actors are continuously shaped 
and reshaped by social practices such as discourse, persuasion, collective 
learning, socialization, institutionalization, etc.253 This approach is opposed 
to the realist view, according to which states are unitary actors that pursue 
their own national interests, which are characterized as being predetermined: 
formed without any social interaction with other actors in the international 
realm.254 In order to grasp the significance of discourse theory for the case we 
are making, it is first necessary to briefly outline Habermas’s theory of com-
municative action.
Habermas’s discourse theoretical approach is best understood as a late 
modern attempt to explain rationality.255 For Habermas, rationality is neither 
something objective nor something subjective, but rather the result of a con-
tinuous communicative process of forming, criticizing, and revising conclu-
sions. In Habermas’s view, the way rational conclusions can be reached is by 
uttering speech acts that imply specific validity claims (Geltungsansprüche). 
These validity claims are subject to the assessment by the participants of the 
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rational discourse. In this discourse, it is possible to influence other persons’ 
actions if the claim one presents possesses sufficient rational force.256 In this 
sense, a discourse of the Habermasian type is an intersubjective forum for ut-
tering, reviewing, and criticizing validity claims.257
How exactly should this discourse look like? In the ideal-type discursive 
situation that Habermas devises—the so-called “ideal speech situation”258—
all participants in the discourse have equal weight to make claims and assess 
and criticize others’ arguments. In this ideal situation, all coercion must be 
eliminated so that only the “unforced force of the better argument”259 prevails. 
The type of reasoning which, according to Habermas, should be used to find 
the better argument is communicative action. In contrast to instrumental and 
strategic action, which aim at a person’s own success (solitarily in the case of 
instrumental action, socially by way of persuading others in the case of strate-
gic action), communicative action is oriented towards reaching mutual under-
standing by exchanging arguments.260 Reasons, in this setting, play a crucial 
role because they allow persons to justify their claims to others. If the reasons 
are good enough, they may convince others of the argument and lead to an 
unforced consensus.
What is particularly important for the context of Security Council decisions 
is the fact that, in Habermas’s theory, not only empirical statements can be 
vindicated in rational discourse but also commands and value judgments,261 
which include normative claims.262 The claims made in and around the Se-
curity Council are of a predominantly political and legal nature and are rarely 
merely empirical. Because legal and political claims are generally normative 
claims, they can be vindicated in rational discourse. According to Habermas, 
this means that such legal and political claims can be found to be true, as long 
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as we can engage in a discourse about them and are able to reach a consensus 
that is based on the best argument.263
This rough sketch of Habermas’s theory of communicative action reveals 
that normative claims like the ones made in the Security Council can form 
the object of rational discourse. In this discourse, the claim supported with 
the best reasons will prove to be the better argument and will convince the 
participants. In our view, such a discursive environment in which people en-
gage in the exchange of rational arguments is best described as a “rhetorical 
community”.264 Depending on the nature of this community, different lan-
guages will be spoken. In the discourse in and around the Security Council, 
the languages that are primarily spoken are the languages of politics and law, 
although, for example, the language of morality can sometimes also play a role. 
These languages not only determine the conditions based on which actors may 
participate in the discourse but they also “establish … roles and relations and 
voices, positions from which and audiences to which one may speak.”265 Each 
participant of the rhetorical community in and around the Security Council 
will propose certain political and/or legal claims and will support them with 
reasons. Depending on the strength of these reasons, other participants will 
(or will not) be convinced by the claims. In doing so, the participants in this 
rhetorical community shape and reshape the conclusions that are being drawn 
from the Council’s political and legal framework.
A sceptic might question whether discourse theory can indeed be meaning-
fully applied to the realm of the Security Council. Is the Security Council not, 
above all, a forum for power politics and hence the very opposite of an ideal 
speech situation? The sceptic will point out that, contrary to the Habermasian 
ideal, not all members of the Security Council have the same access to the dis-
course. For example, the permanent members possess the veto power, which 
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allows them to discard all non-procedural matters.266 Also, as explained in Sec-
tion 1.1, some of the informal Security Council meetings, such as the ‘Group 
of Friends’ and the ‘Contact Group’, are only open to some of the Council 
members. For these reasons, deliberations in the Security Council are greatly 
unbalanced, so that, it could be argued, most (if not all) arguments based on 
discourse theory are bound to fail when it comes to the Security Council.
We do, of course, not deny the existence of asymmetries within the Secu-
rity Council. However, we argue that the virtues of reason-giving also apply 
to speech situations that are not ideal. In fact, Habermas himself does not 
hold that real-life discourses could measure up to ideal speech situations.267 
Instead, he points out that the idea of an ideal speech situation is a counterfac-
tual standard that allows for the assessment of the quality of an argument.268 
It is obvious that in real life, self-interest based arguments by powerful actors 
are ubiquitous. Yet this does not mean that arguments used in communicative 
action (that is, reasoned arguments) are completely absent in the debate.269 
If such arguments are made at least to some extent, then critics are enabled 
to come into play and to point out that there is a gap between a participant’s 
arguments and actions (this will later be discussed under the term ‘discursive 
opening’).270 Thus, in order for our theory to get off the ground, it is sufficient 
that reasoned discourse takes place to a minimal extent.
As Ian Johnstone has pointed out, such a minimally reasoned exchange al-
ready exists in and around the Security Council today.271 What is necessary 
(and sufficient) for such a minimally reasoned debate to occur is “a sense of 
being in a relationship of some duration, from which common meanings and 
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expectations have emerged, and of being engaged in an enterprise the general 
purpose of which all understand in roughly the same way.”272 In the case of the 
Security Council, these common meanings and expectations derive from the 
legal limits set out in Section 2.1 above, in particular those contained in the un 
Charter. This framework structures the debates in the Council, defining which 
arguments are acceptable or convincing and which ones are not. In the case 
of certain, particularly far-reaching resolutions, the Council has even found it 
necessary to render the process leading up to their adoption more open and 
inclusive, which “suggest[s] that a moderately inclusive deliberative process is 
not only possible but also understood to be necessary.”273 As a consequence, 
the decisions of the Security Council can, despite the existing asymmetries, be 
understood to result from the discursive processes that are taking place within 
and around the Council.
4.1.2 Reasons for Giving Reasons
Having thus rebutted the objection that reasoned discourse cannot occur in an 
imperfect speech setting such as the Security Council, we have set the stage for 
our argument in favour of a duty to give reasons for votes cast in the Council. 
The starting point for this argument is the fact that, when confronted with 
an audience, states will seek to justify their positions with reasons relating to 
common interests rather than merely with their own national interests.274 This 
social norm is based on the assumption that actions which affect others will 
be justified with reasons that these others can endorse.275 In contrast, where 
states are not expected to explain their actions in public, as is the case with 
regard to decision-making in the Security Council and its committees at the 
moment, they are likely to base them on pure self-interest.
What can be gained from the fact that, according to the aforementioned 
social norm, states tend to give non-self-interested reasons when justifying 
their actions in public? What are the benefits of exposing the members of the 
Security Council to an open discourse in which they need to provide other-
regarding reasons for their votes? In what follows, we will argue that a duty 
to give reasons in the Security Council has three major virtues. First, it will 
improve the quality of Security Council decisions. Second, it will lead to an 
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increase in legal certainty. And third, it will improve the accountability of the 
Security Council as a whole and of its members.
4.1.2.1 Quality
A duty to give reasons for votes cast in the Security Council will rationalize the 
Council’s decision-making process and, ultimately, improve the quality of the 
adopted decisions. The reason for this is threefold. First, if decision-makers 
have to justify their decisions, they are more likely to exchange information 
and expertise, to carefully assess the available evidence, to weigh the differ-
ent positions, and to reflect on their choices before making a decision.276 This 
allows them to be more successful at finding the decision that is best suited 
for the case at hand.277 Second, under a duty to give reasons, decision-makers 
are more likely to adopt reasonable decisions because they need to persuade 
others, including those most affected by the decisions.278 Since others will be 
able to examine and assess the justifications provided by the decision-maker, 
selfish and immoral arguments as well as arguments based on prejudice are 
likely to be suppressed.279 Thus, only a limited range of reasons can be invoked 
in order to justify decisions. In particular, decision-makers have fewer options 
to adopt decisions that are based on self-interested reasons.280 As Mathilde 
Cohen points out, “the duty to give reasons pushes decision-makers to pick 
the just outcomes.”281 Third, decisions based on grounds that can be endorsed 
by others will in the long run lead to an improvement of decision-making in 
general. Future decision-makers are more likely to base their decisions on the 
non-self-interested reasons that antecedent decision-makers have given.282
It could be objected that, if members of the Security Council are obliged to 
provide reasons for their votes, they will simply give hypocritical reasons. In 
other words, they will pay lip service to the common good, while continuing 
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to vote in a self-interested manner. If they start to ‘talk the talk’ of peace and 
international security, for example, they will merely do so for instrumental and 
strategic purposes.283 Therefore, the objection goes, a duty to give reasons will 
cause an increase in hypocrisy rather than an actual improvement of the qual-
ity of decisions.
This objection can be refuted by drawing on the notion of the so-called “civi-
lizing force of hypocrisy”.284 Jon Elster, who coined the term, argues that the fact 
that actors adopt impartial arguments—even if only for strategic  reasons—
has a beneficial effect because it exerts a civilizing force upon them.285 This 
civilizing force can be characterized as a two-stage process. At a first stage, 
states adjust to international pressures and public criticism by making some 
concessions and by beginning to ‘talk the talk’ that the public wants to hear, 
albeit only for instrumental or strategic reasons. They do so, not because they 
believe in the values they publicly support, but because they think that it will 
reduce those pressures and maximize their benefits. For example, a member 
of the Security Council may adopt a human rights-based explanation for its 
vote, although its real motives are purely strategic. Once states employ other- 
regarding language such as human rights, however, they enter the second 
stage. At this stage, a process of argumentative discourse in the Haberma-
sian sense begins to take effect. Once states start to use impartial rather than 
self-interested arguments, that is, once they start to ‘talk the talk’—even if 
in a merely hypocritical manner—they enter a discursive realm which is 
characterized by argumentation, persuasion, and criticism.286 By adopting 
 arguments that are at odds with their practices, states create a “discursive 
opening”.287 Once they give way to pressures and start to use arguments based 
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on  non-self-interested reasons to justify their decisions, their critics are able to 
step in and challenge them for not complying in practice with the standards 
and values they publicly endorse:288 “If you are really committed to stopping 
these massive human rights violations, then why do you veto the resolution?” 
This criticism can induce states to conform their policies to their public state-
ments.289 To put it differently, what actors in the rhetorical community in and 
around the Security Council would start to do is to “cue”290 the (other) mem-
bers of the Council by criticizing them for votes that are based on illegitimate 
reasons. Cueing is designed to induce them to adopt other reasons and to vote 
in conformity with the law and common values.291 This process of cueing 
or pointing the finger at other actors is, as José Alvarez observes, especially 
important on the international level, which—in contrast to the domestic 
level—is characterized by relatively few enforcement mechanisms.292 What is 
more, as Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink argue, “the more [states] ‘talk the 
talk’ … the more they entangle themselves in a … discourse which they cannot 
escape in the long run”.293 This process of “self-entrapment”294 may then be re-
inforced by a process of self-persuasion: over time, public officials may come to 
believe themselves in the policy positions they advocate in public.295 In order 
to reduce cognitive dissonance,296 officials may eventually “begin believing in 
what they initially simply pretended they believed in.”297
At this point, critics might intervene by questioning whether the psycholog-
ical concepts of cognitive dissonance and self-persuasion can be transferred 
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from human beings to states.298 In other words, what has been stated above 
might be correct for public officials, but does not suffice to explain a change 
in the behaviour of states. Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks have presented 
a reply to this objection by pointing out that acculturation processes do not 
only occur in individuals but also in large-scale organizations like states.299 
Macro-level developments (that is, developments on the international level 
such as the ratification of a human rights treaty), they argue, have an effect 
on micro-level developments by influencing relevant individual actors (for ex-
ample government officials, ngo activists, journalists, or ordinary citizens).300 
These individual actors, in turn, have an impact on the state’s laws and poli-
cies. Hence, according to Goodman and Jinks, there is a “macro-micro-macro 
causal explanation”301 that accounts for the socialization of states. Following 
this explanation, we argue that through macro-micro-macro processes, an in-
ternalization of internationally shared values can also take place with regard to 
the member states of the Security Council. They, too, can come to believe their 
own impartial arguments and adapt their behaviour to public expectations.302 
Thus, Council members can undergo a process of identity change in the sense 
that they will come to conceive of the once hypocritically adopted norms as 
the “normal thing to do”.303
In summary, we argue that a duty to give reasons will lead Council members 
to justify their votes by invoking reasons that relate to common values (rather 
than their own interests) and that this will, in the long term, influence their 
voting behaviour and result in qualitatively better decisions.
4.1.2.2 Legal Certainty
Secondly, a duty to give reasons for votes cast in the Security Council will lead 
to an increase in legal certainty. Legal certainty is widely seen as constituting 
one of the primary pillars of the rule of law.304 The rule of law requires that 
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laws and decisions are, in the words of the ECtHR, “sufficiently precise to allow 
the person … to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, 
the consequences which a given action may entail.”305 In a similar vein, Cohen 
argues that people in legal systems ought to be able to “know in advance and 
in stable and general terms what is required by the law so that they can orga-
nize their life accordingly”, adding that “[i]f law is to bind people, they must 
be able, without undue difficulty, to find out what it is.”306 Without knowing 
the reasons for a law or a decision, however, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
understand its content. Thus, reason-giving may be characterized as “one of 
the essential properties of the concept of the rule of law, if not the essential 
one.”307
Accordingly, legal systems that are based on the rule of law, including 
those of international organizations, typically prescribe a duty to give rea-
sons. Article 296(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(‘tfeu’),308 for example, stipulates: “Legal acts shall state the reasons on which 
they are based and shall refer to any proposals, initiatives, recommendations, 
requests or opinions required by the Treaties.” In a case that touched on Ar-
ticle 296(2) tfeu, the ecj—in line with the aforementioned jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR—argued that statements of reasons “must disclose in a clear and 
unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted 
that measure in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the 
reasons for it.”309
Despite the fact that the Security Council is a highly political body, it is, 
as has been pointed out in Section 2.1 above, subject to the rule of law. The 
paradigm of legal certainty therefore also applies in the context of the Secu-
rity Council. The states, non-state entities, and individuals affected by a given 
decision of the Security Council (or one of its committees) must be able to 
understand what it requires of them and what consequences non-compliance 
may entail. Forcing the Council members to submit reasons for their voting 
behaviour and thus to provide substantive information will allow the affected 
actors to assess more accurately the content of a specific decision. Knowing 
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the reasons behind a decision will, in turn, allow them to forecast with more 
precision what decisions the Security Council is going to adopt in the future. In 
this sense, reason-giving can be seen as a remedy for the epistemic deficits that 
result from the lack of transparency that, as explained in Section 1, currently 
characterizes Security Council deliberations.310
Thus, requiring members of the Security Council to disclose the reasons for 
their voting behaviour will increase legal certainty and thereby also compli-
ance with the rule of law.
4.1.2.3 Accountability
A duty to give reasons will, lastly, improve the accountability of the Security 
Council and its members. The most widely accepted understanding of the 
concept of accountability—its ‘core sense’—associates it with “the process of 
being called ‘to account’ to some authority for one’s actions”,311 which entails 
some form of oversight and control.312
Although there is no final arbiter of actions of the Security Council, there is 
a range of different actors to which the Council may be called to account for its 
decisions and the Council members for their voting behaviour. As explained in 
Section 2, courts or quasi-judicial bodies that can engage in a legal review of 
Security Council action or of votes cast in the Council include the icj, the inter-
national criminal tribunals, the icc, the ECtHR, the ecj, the un Human Rights 
Committee, and domestic courts. In addition, also non-judicial entities such 
as the General Assembly, regional organizations, and the un member states 
scrutinize Security Council action for its conformity with international law. 
Furthermore, there are lawyers, representatives of ngos, and ordinary citizens 
who take part in the rhetorical community around the Security Council.313 The 
languages of law and politics provide the entirety of this community with the 
tools for reviewing and assessing what the Security Council members decide. 
The rhetorical community engages the Council in “an ongoing dialogue, an 
‘expressive’ mode of review”.314
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Accountability requires transparency with regard to decision-making. This 
holds especially true for the decision-making organ of an international organi-
zation on which not all members are represented, such as the Security Council. 
In its report on the accountability of international organizations, the Inter-
national Law Association (‘ila’) observed that “[n]on-plenary organs acting 
on behalf of the whole membership under the governing provisions of an io 
[international organization] have a special obligation to act as transparently 
as possible” and should hold their meetings, in principle, in public.315 Like-
wise, the reasons for the positions adopted by the states represented in that 
organ must be transparent. The ila report therefore includes as one of the key 
requirements to achieve effective accountability that “organs of an io should 
state the reasons for their decisions or particular courses of action whenever 
necessary for the assessment of their proper functioning or otherwise relevant 
from the point of view of their accountability.”316
A duty to give reasons for votes cast in the Security Council is a necessary 
prerequisite for the meaningful exercise of the various ways of controlling and 
holding accountable the Council and its members. Those affected by a deci-
sion of (or a vote in) the Security Council can only effectively examine and, 
if necessary, contest it, if they know the reasons that have led to its adoption. 
Equally, it will, as a general rule, be inevitable for the body charged with re-
viewing a decision or voting behaviour to know its rationales in order to be 
able to assess its conformity with international law.
This holds even more true for decisions of the Security Council (and its 
subsidiary bodies) than for those of other international organs. Security Coun-
cil resolutions are typically drafted in haste and under considerable political 
pressure.317 Accordingly, the wording of their operative parts is often unclear 
and vague. Sometimes the text of a resolution is deliberately left ambiguous so 
as to ensure approval by all Council members.318 The preambular paragraphs 
of resolutions, in turn, are often simply used to ‘dump’ contentious proposals 
and only rarely fully reflect the object and purpose of the resolution.319 Simi-
lar problems affect the resolutions that set out the terms of reference of the 
various sanctions committees.320 Thus, it would be crucial to have access to 
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the preparatory work of Security Council resolutions to make sense of them. 
The travaux préparatoires of a resolution include working papers, drafts of the 
resolution, and records of the discussions leading up to the resolution, espe-
cially statements made before or after the vote.321 As the icj pointed out in 
its Kosovo opinion, “[t]he interpretation of Security Council resolutions may 
require the Court to analyse statements by representatives of members of the 
Security Council made at the time of their adoption.”322
However, in the case of most Security Council resolutions, such statements 
which could serve as useful means of interpretation will simply not be avail-
able. As explained in Section 1, the discussions leading up to a Security Council 
resolution mainly take place behind the scenes, in informal settings. Thus, large 
parts of the preparatory work are not on public record, so that the motivations 
of the Council members, and thus the reasons underpinning a given resolu-
tion, remain in the dark. The voting behaviour in the Security Council can only 
be assessed based on the hypothetical reasons that the rhetorical community 
assumes to be underlying it. As a consequence of this uncertainty, Council 
members, when confronted with criticism that their reasons are illegitimate, 
can simply argue that their votes were based on other than the alleged reasons.
A duty to give reasons would not only render the Security Council and its 
members more accountable, but would, thereby, also increase the legitimacy 
of the Council and of its decisions. While there are different understandings of 
the concept of legitimacy in international law,323 a central aspect of most of 
them concerns the process of decision-making, in particular with regard to 
qualities such as openness, transparency, representation, and participation.324 
For Thomas Franck, for instance, the essence of legitimacy is “the percep-
tion of those addressed by a rule or a rule-making institution that the rule or 
institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally 
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accepted principles of right process.”325 A duty to give reasons would enhance 
the transparency of the Security Council’s decision-making process. It would 
allow the participants of the rhetorical community in and around the Council 
to be clear about the reasons for a given vote in, or decision of, the Council, to 
debate them, and to either let themselves be convinced by them if they find 
them well-founded or contest them if they find them ill-founded. Enhancing 
the procedural legitimacy of the Council’s decision-making would, in turn, 
have a positive effect on compliance with its decisions. For, as has again been 
pointed out by Franck, the perception that a rule has come into being in ac-
cordance with the right process “exerts a pull toward compliance on those ad-
dressed normatively.”326
This is not to argue that an increase in accountability through public 
 reason-giving is necessarily beneficial in other international contexts than the 
Security Council. In mediation, for example, confidentiality serves to build an 
environment of trust where additional information can be disclosed and par-
ties are more willing to disclose the reasons relating to their interests.327 Con-
fidentiality also plays an important role in international diplomacy. For the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (‘icrc’), for example, secrecy even 
forms part of its identity.328 However, decision-making in the Security Council 
is not comparable to the settling of bilateral disputes as in cases of mediation 
or to the working methods of the icrc. States involved in mediation have no 
wider responsibility towards the international community. Similarly, the icrc 
sees itself as accountable to victims of armed conflict, not states or the wider 
public.329 It therefore understands confidential dialogue with states or armed 
groups to be the most effective means of protecting individuals in situations 
in which rational discourse has been abandoned.330 The Security Council and 
its members, in contrast, are accountable to the whole membership of the 
United Nations: they act as delegates of all other un members and can thus be 
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characterized as “trustees of the international community”.331 Improving the 
accountability of Security Council decisions through a duty to give reasons is, 
therefore, a pressing concern.
4.2 Proposal for a Duty to Give Reasons
4.2.1 Introducing a Duty to Give Reasons
The Security Council has been the subject of a multitude of reform attempts,332 
many of which have aimed at changing the exercise of the veto by the Council’s 
permanent members. The first such reform efforts were undertaken as early as 
in 1949 when the General Assembly adopted a resolution that asked the per-
manent members to “exercise the veto only when they consider the question of 
vital importance.”333 This recommendation, however, remained unheeded. In 
more recent years, there have been proposals to limit the use of the veto in r2p 
situations,334 to establish a duty to explain the rationale for casting a veto,335 
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and to introduce a procedure of ‘indicative voting’ in the Security Council.336 
All of these reform efforts have focused on the exercise of the veto by the p5. 
None of them has, so far, led to any changes in the Council’s practice.
As opposed to this, the proposal we present in what follows imposes a duty 
on each member of the Security Council to explain the reasons for its vote in 
a public meeting. All Council members would be obliged to explain all types 
of votes they cast, including votes that do not qualify as vetoes. Our proposal 
takes account of legitimate interests that may conflict with reason-giving and 
is designed with a view to practical implementation. Accordingly, it allows for 
some flexibility: it provides for a number of exceptions to the duty to give rea-
sons, and the extent of explanation required may differ depending on the type 
of decision at hand. Our proposition aims to make the procedure of reason-
giving as straightforward and efficient as possible. Many votes will not require 
lengthy statements. Also, if a Council member agrees with the explanation 
given by another member, it can simply join that explanation (or parts of it). 
Nevertheless, the general rule will be that Council members must give reasons 
for their votes.
To be clear, our proposal does not require the Security Council to hold all 
meetings in public. It takes account of the Council’s nature as a quintessen-
tially political organ that will often have to discuss delicate political matters in 
informal settings. For this reason, our proposal does not prevent the Council 
from holding informal consultations and private meetings. Instead, it simply 
requires its members to explain, in a public meeting, all votes they cast.
There are three different ways of implementing a duty to give reasons as 
we conceive of it: first, by amending the un Charter; second, by amending the 
PRoP; and third, by an informal change of practice.
First, a duty of the Council members to give reasons could be introduced by 
amending the un Charter. However, any such amendment would have to be 
ratified by all permanent members of the Council.337 Given the lack of success 
of previous reform attempts that aimed at changing the composition of the Se-
curity Council or the right to veto, the prospects for the introduction of a duty 
to give reasons by way of an amendment of the un Charter are dim.338 For this 
reason, we will not further consider this option.
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Second, a duty to give reasons could be implemented by way of amendment 
of the PRoP. As opposed to the un Charter, the PRoP can be amended without 
the consent of the p5. While neither Article 30 of the un Charter (the provision 
concerning the rules of procedure of the Council) nor the PRoP themselves 
stipulate special voting requirements for amending the Council’s rules of pro-
cedure, it is generally recognized that the requirement of Article 27(2) of the 
un Charter is applicable.339 Pursuant to this provision, Security Council deci-
sions “on procedural matters” are to be made “by an affirmative vote of nine 
members”. Accordingly, an amendment of the PRoP that would introduce a 
duty to give reasons for votes cast in the Council could not be prevented by the 
veto of a permanent member. In times of predominantly deadlocked Security 
Council reforms, changing its working methods by way of amendment of the 
PRoP thus constitutes a way out of the impasse.340
One could object to this way of implementing the duty to give reasons that 
a permanent member, when confronted with a draft for an amendment of the 
PRoP, would make use of the so-called ‘double veto’.341 Thus, it could first raise 
what is called the preliminary question,342 which puts to a vote in the Council 
the question as to whether an issue (in our case: the amendment of the PRoP) 
constitutes a procedural or non-procedural matter. The permanent member 
could then use its veto a first time in the vote on the preliminary question, with 
the effect that the issue would have to be considered as a non-procedural mat-
ter according to Article 27(3) of the un Charter, triggering the veto privilege. 
In the ensuing vote, it could prevent adoption of the proposal by a second use 
of its veto.
However, although a permanent member could not be prevented from using 
its double veto in such a manner, it is unlikely that it would do so as it would 
risk losing its face before the other Council members and the wider un mem-
bership. For it is difficult to see how a reasonable argument could be made as 
to why an amendment of the PRoP should constitute a non-procedural mat-
ter in the sense of Article 27(3) rather than a procedural matter in the sense 
of Article 27(2) of the Charter. Neither the wording of the Charter nor that of 
the PRoP leave any doubt that the introduction of a duty to give reasons in 
the PRoP would qualify as a procedural matter: the Council adopted its rules, 
 75 A Duty to Give Reasons in the Security Council 
international organizations law review 14 (2017) 13-86
<UN>
343 Emphasis added.
344 Statement by the Delegations of the Four Sponsoring Governments on ‘The Yalta Formu-
la’ on Voting in the Security Council (8 June 1945), uncio Vol xi, 710, para. i.2., reprinted 
in Bailey and Daws, supra note 28, p. 456.
345 See Zimmermann, Article 27 un Charter, supra note 175, paras. 90–93; Report of the In-
terim Committee of the General Assembly on the Problem of Voting in the Security Council 
(15 July 1948), un Doc. a/578, p. 201. See also Report of the Open-ended Working Group, 57th 
Session (2003), un Doc. a/57/47, Supplement No 47, Annex iv, p. 13 (confirming that the 
veto should be excluded in procedural matters).
346 See Zimmermann, Article 27 un Charter, supra note 175, para. 159; Repertoire of the Prac-
tice of the Security Council, 17th Supplement 2010–2011, Part ii, Provisional Rules of Pro-
cedure, 2011, p. 66 (‘Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2010–2011’). See 
also Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 16th Supplement 2008–2009, Part ii 
Provisional Rules of Procedure, 2009, p. 320 (confirming that in recent years, the Council 
has not examined the preliminary question).
347 Wood, supra note 6, p. 159.
348 Volger, supra note 11, p. 196.
entitled “Provisional Rules of Procedure”, based on Article 30 of the Charter, 
which stipulates that the Council “shall adopt its own rules of procedure”.343 
Already the San Francisco Declaration of the four sponsoring governments of 
1945 had made it clear that decisions made under Articles 28–32 of the Charter, 
which appear under the heading “Procedure”, constitute procedural matters 
within the meaning of Article 27(2) and that, therefore, “the Council will, by a 
vote of any seven of its members, adopt or alter its rules of procedure.”344 This 
position has been confirmed repeatedly since then.345 Finally, the fact that, 
due to an informal agreement in the Council, the double veto has not been 
used since 1959 makes it even more unlikely that a permanent member would 
resort to this procedure.346
Third, a duty to give reasons could be implemented by way of an informal 
change of practice. Indeed, most of the recent changes in the Security Coun-
cil’s working methods have been achieved not by amending the un Charter 
or the PRoP but by introducing new practices through informal mutual agree-
ments among Council members.347 Such mutually agreed changes may later 
be ‘formalized’ through Statements or Notes by the President of the Security 
Council or, more rarely, resolutions of the Council.348
There are advantages and disadvantages to both the formal way of intro-
ducing a duty to give reasons by way of an amendment of the PRoP and the 
informal way through a change of practice. A formal amendment of the PRoP 
would be more transparent, and the Council members would most likely re-
gard the duty as more binding. In contrast, an informal change would allow 
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the Council and its members to retain more flexibility, which increases the 
prospects for adoption. Although we do not favour one way of implementa-
tion over the other, we will—for the sake of illustration—put forth a concrete 
proposal for a formal amendment of the PRoP in order to demonstrate how 
a provision introducing a duty to give reasons for votes cast in the Security 
Council could be worded. In our opinion, Rule 48 of the PRoP, which opens 
Chapter ix entitled “Publicity of Meetings, Records”, seems particularly well 
suited to accommodate a duty to give reasons. Our proposition can serve as a 
guideline, regardless of whether the duty to give reasons is endorsed formally 
or informally. Also in the latter case, that is, if the Council members agree on a 
change of practice rather than a formal amendment of the PRoP, our proposal 
can function as an inspiration as to the content of such an informal change.
We suggest to add a new second paragraph to Rule 48, with the following 
wording:
Rule 48
Unless it decides otherwise, the Security Council shall meet in public.
Each Member of the Security Council shall provide the reasons for its vote in 
the public meeting. A Member may upon request be relieved by the President 
from its duty to give reasons if it demonstrates that there is a risk that disclo-
sure of the respective information would cause harm to legitimate privacy 
or security interests. The President shall grant the exemption provided that 
information is only withheld to the degree necessary to protect the respec-
tive interest and that the possible harm caused by disclosure of the relevant 
information to the protected interest outweighs the interest in disclosure.
Any recommendation to the General Assembly regarding the appoint-
ment of the Secretary-General shall be discussed and decided at a private 
meeting.
4.2.2 “Each Member of the Security Council …”
A first issue that must be clarified is to whom exactly the duty to give reasons 
applies. Is it incumbent on each member of the Security Council or rather on 
the Council as a whole? As demonstrated in Section  4.1.2, there are a num-
ber of different rationales supporting the introduction of a duty to give rea-
sons for the voting behaviour in the Security Council: reason-giving increases 
the quality of the adopted decisions, enhances legal certainty, and allows the 
Security Council and its members to be held accountable. Depending on the 
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importance one attaches to these different rationales, the duty to give reasons 
will apply to different entities. For instance, if the accountability of the Secu-
rity Council (or one of its committees) as a collective body is given the greatest 
weight, then a statement of reasons issued by the Council (or the respective 
committee) itself might be the best means of allowing those affected by its de-
cisions to challenge them. This explains, for example, why the 1267 Committee 
has been obliged to publish a joint ‘narrative summary of reasons’ for listing 
individuals on the sanctions list.349 This narrative summary allows individuals 
to substantiate their requests for delisting by challenging a consolidated set of 
reasons that has led to their listing, rather than having to find these reasons in 
separate statements of the Committee’s members. On the other hand, if the 
quality of votes (and, thereby, of the decisions to which they contribute) is giv-
en more importance, then individual statements of reasons by each Council 
member are preferable, since states are more likely to adopt reasonable deci-
sions if they have to persuade other actors of their respective reasons. Since 
the main concern of our proposal is to force Council members to engage in a 
rational discourse, we suggest—at least with regard to decisions of the Council 
itself (as opposed to those of its subsidiary bodies)—the following solution: 
instead of a duty incumbent on the Council as a collective body, each Council 
member should be obliged to provide the reasons for its vote.
For the same reason, unlike the better part of previous reform proposals,350 
the duty to give reasons we propose is not restricted to the permanent mem-
bers but extends to all members of the Security Council. The reason for this is 
simple: despite the fact that the veto privilege accords the p5 significant voting 
power, they are not the only members with the capacity to prevent a decision 
in the Council. Pursuant to Article 27(3) of the un Charter, the vote of at least 
seven non-permanent members has the same effect as the veto of one per-
manent member. Therefore, it would be inconsistent to impose a duty to give 
reasons only on the p5. In order to set in motion the process of the civilizing 
force of hypocrisy and to ensure that individual Council members can be held 
accountable for their voting behaviour, it is necessary to oblige all members 
to give reasons for their votes.351 Even with regard to votes of non-permanent 
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members that do not gather the necessary majority to prevent a decision of the 
Security Council, a duty to give reasons serves a useful purpose as it enables 
the rhetorical community to assess the reasons underlying these votes.
To draw an analogy, if the Security Council was to be compared to a court, 
our proposal could be said to follow the approach prevalent in common law 
systems (where, in general, every judge delivers her or his own opinion), rath-
er than in civil law systems (where, in general, the court gives reasons for its 
judgment as a collective body). This ‘common law approach’ ensures that the 
individual members of the Council cannot hide behind the explanation given 
by the majority while still maintaining their self-interested justifications when 
voting. By requiring every member to explain its reasons independently, the 
discursive effects referred to in Section 4.1.2 can come into play for each mem-
ber. In addition, our ‘common law proposal’ is also more practicable than a 
joint statement of reasons by the Security Council as a whole. Our proposal 
does not require that the Council members agree on a certain justification for 
a decision. Also, it obviates the need for a secretary or a clerk in charge of draft-
ing joint statements of reasons for decisions.
For subsidiary bodies of the Security Council tasked with adopting mea-
sures that directly affect individuals, on the other hand, the ‘civil law model’ 
may be preferable. In these cases, the main concern is to provide for an effec-
tive accountability mechanism with regard to the decisions of the subsidiary 
body itself, an aim which may be better served through the provision of a joint 
statement of reasons.
4.2.3 “… shall provide the reasons …”
Another aspect of our proposals that must be spelled out is the extent of rea-
sons that each member of the Security Council has to provide in a public meet-
ing to explain its votes. We argue that the extent depends on the following 
variables: the type of decision at hand (procedural or non-procedural; execu-
tive, administrative, or legislative)352 and the type of Security Council member 
concerned (permanent or non-permanent).
With regard to the type of decision at hand, the extent of the reasons that 
need to be given depends, first, on whether a procedural or non-procedural 
matter is voted on. In the case of matters that are clearly procedural, the re-
quirements regarding reason-giving will in general be relaxed. In many cases, 
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these matters are of such minor significance that an explanation will not be 
required at all. This is in line with the current practice of the Security Council, 
which in cases of “procedural motions such as the adoption of the agenda, the 
extension of invitations, and the suspension or adjournment of a meeting”353 
has even dispensed voting altogether. However, situations might arise in which 
also votes on procedural matters can be of greater significance. For example, 
the establishment of a new body or agency that assists the Security Council 
in fulfilling its functions, can—depending on the nature of this body—have 
rather far-reaching implications. In such a case, the extent of reasons provided 
will need to be more elaborate.
Second, the extent of reasons depends on whether an executive, administra-
tive, or legislative-type decision is at hand. As we have indicated above, the Se-
curity Council has considerably broadened its scope of activity over the last 25 
years and has started to adopt—in addition to decisions that can be qualified 
as executive—an increasing number of decisions that are of a legislative or ad-
ministrative nature.354 As a general rule, decisions that directly affect individu-
als, which are typically adopted by the Security Council’s subsidiary bodies,355 
need to be supported by detailed reasons.356 Explanations must be such as to 
enable the individual to identify and understand the reasons that have led to 
the decision. On the other hand, the requirements with regard to the degree of 
reasons are less strict if decisions only have an indirect impact on individuals, 
as is the case with general and abstract Security Council decisions.357 Thus, 
the more direct and important the impact on individuals is, the higher the 
requirements concerning the extent of reasons are. Whereas in some situa-
tions a single sentence might suffice in order to comply with the duty, a more 
elaborate justification is needed in others.
In the case of executive-type decisions, that is, decisions within the scope 
of the traditional crisis management role of the Security Council, the Coun-
cil possesses large discretion. This especially holds true for the determination 
according to Article 39 of the Charter concerning the existence of a threat to 
the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. In addition, since the 
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Council needs to be able to take “prompt and effective action”358 with regard 
to the maintenance of international peace and security, there is normally no 
time for extensive deliberation.359 Accordingly, the requirements for the ex-
planation of votes on such decisions are reduced. Yet also executive-type deci-
sions demand a minimal extent of reasons to allow for their assessment by the 
rhetorical community. This is especially the case for resolutions adopted under 
Chapter vii that touch on matters of major political importance.
As regards administrative-type decisions, that is, decisions that are aimed at 
and directly affect specific individuals, groups, or corporate entities, the duty 
to give reasons is particularly important as it is an indispensable prerequisite 
of accountability. Thus, we have argued in Section 3.1 above that, at least with 
regard to some of these decisions, international human rights law imposes al-
ready today, de lege lata, an obligation on the Security Council to give reasons 
and, respectively, on its members to explain their votes in the Council. As far 
as the Council has established international criminal tribunals for the prosecu-
tion of certain individuals, it has discharged this obligation by transposing it on 
these tribunals. In contrast, the Council has not imposed a corresponding duty 
to give reasons on its sanctions committees, even though they are authorized 
to impose measures such as travel bans, assets freezes, and arms embargoes 
on specific individuals and non-state entities. When the Council (or one of 
its subsidiary bodies) adopts decisions that directly affect important interests 
of non-state actors, they must be informed about the reasons for the decision 
or, in the case of the sanctions committees, about the basis for the listing. The 
explanations must be detailed enough to allow those affected to understand 
whether their arguments have been properly examined and, if necessary, to 
enable them to challenge the decision.
Concerning legislative-type decisions, finally, a more nuanced view is neces-
sary. The defining characteristic of legislative resolutions is that they impose 
obligations of a general and abstract nature, that is, obligations that are ad-
dressed to all states and that are not restricted to a particular situation.360  
Accordingly, they do not normally affect individuals, at least not directly.361  
In line with the general rule stated above, when voting on such decisions, 
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Council members would therefore not need to provide elaborate reasons. Nev-
ertheless, there are important arguments in favour of providing robust reasons 
also for legislative-type decisions.362 Despite their general character, they of-
ten affect individuals indirectly, as is the case, for example, with the counter-
terrorism measures that states are required to adopt under Resolution 1373. 
What is more, legislative acts of the Council typically have far-reaching con-
sequences, not only because they are directed at all states but also because 
they are concerned with issues of major political importance.363 This is why 
it is crucial to get Council members to engage in an open exchange of rational 
arguments that can be assessed by the broader rhetorical community, not least 
to ensure the broad cooperation that implementation of legislative resolutions 
requires.364 As compared to executive-type decisions, legislative decisions will 
in general necessitate more detailed reasons because they directly concern all 
states and are more likely to indirectly affect individuals. Unlike administra-
tive decisions, which must be supported by specific reasons allowing those 
who are directly affected to challenge them, however, it will suffice for Council 
members to provide general reasons corresponding to the general and abstract 
character of the obligations imposed by legislative decisions.365
Furthermore, the extent of reasons required depends on the type of Security 
Council member that casts its vote. In particular, permanent members will in 
general face different requirements than non-permanent members. Although 
both non-permanent and permanent members can prevent decisions, only the 
latter have the power to veto a decision on their own. As we pointed out in Sec-
tion 3.2 regarding the de lege lata duty to give reasons under the r2p, since the 
p5 are in a more powerful position, they must bear stricter obligations. Indeed, 
the very fact that these particular states were given the veto power in the un 
Charter was justified with the greater responsibilities that are incumbent on 
them.366 For this reason, the p5 will in general have to provide more detailed 
reasons for their votes in the Security Council than non-permanent members. 
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Nevertheless, in a situation in which adoption of a decision is prevented not 
by the p5, but seven or more non-permanent members, the latter will have to 
explain in more detail what their motivations for doing so are.
4.2.4 “… for its vote …”
We do not only propose that each member of the Security Council must pro-
vide reasons for its votes, but—again in contrast to other reform proposals—
the duty suggested by us is also not limited to ‘no’ votes. The rationales for 
knowing the reasons behind a given vote apply equally to negative and affirma-
tive votes. The reason for this is that not only a vote against a draft resolution 
of the Security Council can be considered illegal because, for example, it pre-
cludes the Council from preventing massive human rights violations. Also an 
affirmative vote of a member (or its abstention) can be incompatible with in-
ternational law.367 Take, for example, a draft resolution that aims at establish-
ing a sanctions regime that violates human rights. An affirmative vote on such 
a resolution by a Council member may be illegal. Yet the rhetorical community 
will only be able to assess the voting behaviour in such a scenario if the duty 
to give reasons extends to affirmative votes of Council members. Therefore, we 
propose a duty to give reasons for both negative and affirmative votes.
4.2.5 “… harm to legitimate privacy or security interests …”
In order for our proposal for a duty to give reasons to be a workable mecha-
nism, it must not only be flexible with regard to the extent of reasons that 
may be required but also allow for certain exceptions that protect Council 
members from having to disclose sensitive information. We suggest that there 
are two kinds of interests that may justify non-disclosure: privacy interests 
and security interests. According to our proposal, reasons relating to these 
types of interests would not have to be disclosed in a public meeting as long 
as  non-disclosure is necessary and balanced. These exceptions allow Council 
members to efficiently perform their responsibilities under the un Charter, 
while still providing reasons for their votes as far as possible.
Firstly, members of the Council (or of one of its subsidiary bodies) do not 
have to (and indeed must not) disclose in a public meeting information if this 
would violate the privacy of any affected person. Such sensitive information 
includes, for example, bank accounts, addresses, or medical records of persons 
who are to be placed on a sanctions list.
An exception from the duty to give reason must, secondly, apply where 
the relevant information is related to security interests and where there is a 
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risk that disclosure would cause some degree of harm to these interests.368 
A general invocation of security, however, is not sufficient. Instead, a specific 
and identifiable threat to security interests must be shown.369 For example, 
strategic information with regard to the armament and location of military 
forces that is important to the success of an operation authorized by the Coun-
cil would not have to be disclosed. This exception is supported by the fact that 
also under most domestic legal systems, security issues are regularly exempted 
from disclosure requirements.370 The Security Council, whose primary respon-
sibility it is to maintain peace and security on the international level, should 
therefore a fortiori benefit from a respective exemption.
4.2.6 “The President shall grant the exemption …”
Exemptions based on legitimate privacy and security interests are only practi-
cable if there is a body that can decide on giving or refusing them. We believe 
that the President of the Security Council is the most suitable body for exer-
cising this task because it is the President who is entrusted by the PRoP with 
all formal tasks in the Security Council. Among these tasks are, for example, 
those of calling meetings (Rules 1–3), approving the agenda (Rule 7), presiding 
over the meetings (Rule 19), overseeing the conduct of business during meet-
ings (Rules 27–39), and deciding on the importance of corrections to meeting 
records (Rule 52). Because the presidency is held in turns and each President 
only holds office for one month, the risk of lopsided and biased exemptions is 
reduced.
According to our proposal, Council members can submit an exemption 
request to the President before the relevant public Council meeting, setting 
out that there is a risk that the disclosure of specific information would cause 
harm to legitimate privacy or security interests. When receiving an exemp-
tion request, the President will have to undertake a two-stage assessment that 
bears analogy to the two-stage analysis that is applied for human rights limita-
tions.371 At the first stage, the President needs to verify whether the request-
ing Council member indeed possesses a legitimate privacy or security interest 
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with regard to the matter at hand. At the second stage, the President first has to 
analyse whether the Council member suggests withholding information to the 
degree necessary to protect the respective interest (that is, a least restrictive 
means test). The President has to make sure that only information relating to 
the sensible aspects of a matter will be withheld. Consider the example of Se-
curity Council Resolution 1973,372 which authorized un member states to take 
all necessary measures to protect Libyan civilians and establish a no-fly zone 
in the Libyan airspace. With regard to this resolution, a Council member would 
have been justified in withholding information, disclosure of which could have 
jeopardized the security and the success of the military operation. Disclosure 
of such information could have resulted in a considerable degree of harm, es-
pecially to the rebels. There were other parts of the resolution, however, with 
regard to which the Council members probably could not have been exempted 
from providing reasons, including the parts regarding the arms embargo (paras 
13–16), the ban on flights (paras 17–18), and the Panel of Experts (paras 24–29). 
After determining whether withholding certain information is necessary, the 
President then has to engage in balancing the relevant interests. In particular, 
the President has to decide whether the possible harm caused by disclosure 
outweighs the conflicting interest in disclosing the information. Only if with-
holding the information at issue is both necessary and balanced can (and in-
deed must) the President grant the exemption.
In summary, our proposal for a duty to give reasons applies to each mem-
ber of the Security Council and for all types of votes. An exemption from this 
duty is only possible upon request to the President of the Security Council. The 
President will grant the request if the Council member demonstrates that dis-
closure of the respective information would cause harm to legitimate privacy 
or security interests, that the information is only withheld to the degree neces-
sary to protect that interest, and that the possible harm caused by disclosure 
outweighs the interest in disclosure.
5 Conclusion
On 27 March 2013, on the occasion of the inauguration of the newly renovated 
Consultations Room—the chamber adjacent to the Security Council Cham-
ber built in 1978 for holding informal consultations—the representative of the 
Russian Federation (and then Security Council President) remarked:
372 un Security Council Resolution 1973 (17 March 2011), un Doc. s/res/1973.
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This is the place where most important decisions affecting international 
peace and security are hashed out. This is the place where most heated 
debates occur. This is the place where the diplomats who have the privi-
lege to work in the Security Council spend the most interesting hours and 
days of their professional lives. This is, quite simply, the most fascinating 
place in the entire diplomatic universe.373
That the most heated debates on issues affecting international peace and secu-
rity would be held in secret outside the Security Council’s actual meeting place 
is not what states had in mind when they drafted the un Charter and the PRoP. 
They expected these debates to take place in the formal, public meetings of 
the Council, not behind closed doors. They thought that these meetings would 
serve as a forum in which the members of the Council would explain their 
respective positions.374 However, due to the shift of decision-making from the 
Security Council Chamber to the Consultations Room, from public to informal 
meetings, the public meetings have been deprived of their original function. 
As the public meetings have been reduced to mere pro forma affairs, it has be-
come difficult for the rhetorical community in and around the Security Coun-
cil to understand the motives behind a given resolution.
Seen from this perspective, our proposal for a duty to give reasons for votes 
cast in the Security Council is by no means revolutionary: all it aims to achieve 
is to restore the function of the public meetings as it was originally conceived 
and to force the explanation of positions back into the public sphere. Council 
members would still be permitted to negotiate in informal settings, but they 
would have to explain the reasons for their votes in a public meeting. This 
would improve legal certainty regarding the Council’s decisions and enhance 
the accountability (and thus also legitimacy) of the Council and its members. 
Most crucially, however, it would lead to qualitatively better decisions. The 
substance of a debate is shaped to a very considerable degree by its public 
or secret nature. States are acutely aware of this fact. When, for example, the 
373 Inauguration of the Russian Room (Security Council Consultations Room), Remarks by 
H.E. Mr. Vitaly I. Churkin, 27 March 2013, available at: <webtv.un.org/search/inauguration 
-of-the-russian-room-security-council-consultations-room/2258040243001?term=consult
ationsandlanguages=Englishandsort=date> (at 02:30 minutes).
374 See Section 1.1 (demonstrating that in the early years of the un, public meetings were the 
rule). That public meetings were originally conceived as the primary locus for Council 
debates also becomes evident when considering PRoP, Rule 48. The wording of this rule, 
adopted in 1946, makes it clear that, apart from rare exceptions, the Council was supposed 
to meet in public; see also Reid, supra note 27.
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Security Council was to hold a special session on the Ukraine crisis, a dispute 
arose among its members as to the format of the session. While Russia wanted 
an informal consultation behind closed doors, the other Council members in-
sisted on a public meeting.375 States would be more reluctant to block Security 
Council action designed to prevent serious violations of international law if 
they were forced to explain in public their reasons for doing so.
Requiring the members of the Security Council to give reasons for their vot-
ing behaviour accords with the very structure of the international legal system. 
The Council members act as trustees of the international community. The in-
ternational community must know what positions they stand for.
375 Louis Charbonneau, Western Nations Line Up at un to Slam Russia’s Moves on Ukraine, 
Reuters, 3 April 2014, available at: <www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/14/us-ukraine-crisis 
-un-idUSBREA3D03J20140414>.
